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This thesis focuses on Simone Weil’s philosophical, ethical, and religious perspectives on 
affliction by clarifying the essential difference between what is necessary and what is 
good. According to Weil, reality is governed by blind physical and moral necessities. She 
claims that we experience necessity as constraint and constraint as suffering.  But 
affliction, she claims, is something essentially different; it is not reducible to mere 
suffering. I will argue that Weil’s conception of affliction can be best understood as a 
momentarily ‘numinous experience’ of God’s absence or the feeling of the absolute good. 
Numinous experience, according to Rudolf Otto, is a kind of experience which contains a 
quite specific moment and which remains ineffable. What is ineffable can only be felt.  
That is, Weil’s investigation of affliction concentrates on the feeling response to the 
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“The whole planet can suffer no greater torment than a single 
soul. The Christian faith—as I see it— is a man’s refuge in this 
ultimate torment. Anyone in such torment who has the gift of 
opening his heart, rather than contracting it, accepts the means of 
salvation in his heart.” 
 





Simone Weil—a brilliant, Jewish French woman by birth, a strange Catholic, a solitary 
philosopher by instinct, and a Platonist by soul, lived a very short and impossible life 
(1909-1943). It should be mentioned that Simone Weil not only suffered from intolerable 
headaches and self-imposed starvation, which contributed to her death in Ashford, Kent, 
in 1943, but she also suffered deeply  for the useless suffering of the other, and even for 
that of the oppressor or tormentor.
1
   
 
1. Research Question: 
 
There is perhaps no concept in Simone Weil’s work that is of more importance, and yet is 
more complex and difficult, than affliction (malheur). Hence, the question “What is 
affliction?” is the central concern of this thesis.   Since, for Weil, the concept of affliction 
is closely linked with the concept of necessity, (nécessité),
2
 one cannot understand what 
                                                          
1
 Section 1.3 elaborates further on the importance of Weil’s life and thought. 
2
 It should be noticed that, on occasion, Simone Weil capitalizes both terms ‘necessity 
and good’ to emphasis. Her main point is to emphasis the terms whenever she felt it was 
necessary. Regarding the second term, ‘good’, what is important is to bear in mind that 
2 
 
affliction is unless one understands Weil’s account of necessity. This will certainly force 
us to ask: “What is necessity?” before considering the question of affliction.  Hence, the 
present thesis sets out to clarify Simone Weil’s perspectives on both affliction and 
necessity.  
  In Weil’s view, necessity is blind and mechanical, and so far as Weil is 
concerned, it holds our mind and will captive.  In a way, affliction is an experience of 
necessity. Affliction is an extreme form of suffering; it is a kind of horror that submerges 
the whole soul.  It is “a sign of the distance between us and God”.
3
  It “causes God to be 
absent… more absent than a dead man”.
4
  Affliction “deprives its victims of their 
personality and turns them into things”.
5
  That is to say, affliction forces the afflicted 
people to adopt thoughts, (e.g., I am nothing), which are logically contradictory.  The 
person to “whom such a thing occurs has no part in the operation. He [or she] quivers like 
a butterfly pinned alive to a tray”.
6
  
Moreover, Weil remarks that one is “aware of necessity only as constraint and is 
aware of constraint as pain”
7
 or suffering.  But affliction, she claims, is something 
essentially different from suffering.  Although it is inseparable from suffering, it is not 
reducible to a mere psychological, social, or physical suffering.  The two most crucial 
questions to be considered are:  What is affliction? How is affliction different from 
physical suffering? How affliction is different from suffering is a question to be spelled 
out later, (p. 64-7).    
                                                                                                                                                                             
she draws a distinction between relative and absolute good, and I make this distinction 
absolutely clear in Chapter 2 (Sec. 2.3, particularly, p. 53-5).   
3
 Weil, “Some Reflections on the Love of God”, p. 155. 
4
 Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction”, p. 172. 
5
 Ibid., p. 175. 
6
 Ibid., p. 182. 
7
 Ibid., p. 171. 
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For now, what needs to be mentioned is that affliction is nothing else, but an experience 
of a blind, pitiless necessity. As Allen and Springsted have pointed out; the conception of 
necessity reveals “a paradoxical character.  At one and the same time, it is that which 
crushes us and yet allows us life”.
8
  According to Weil, this paradox, which she believes 
to be the essential contradiction in human life, appears as affliction in the following way: 
a person is subject to a blind necessity or force, and craves for the good.
9
  This 
contradiction, Weil states, must be recognized as a fact.
10
  In this way, one can say 
affliction is not only produced by blind, mechanical necessity, but is also its 
manifestation: blind necessity makes itself manifest through affliction.  In brief, affliction 
is a holding together of two opposed ideas: necessity and good.  That is why Simone Weil 
considers affliction, not suffering, to be: The great enigma of human life.
11
 
In the present thesis, I propose to explore and to clarify the twofold thesis: (1) that 
the absence of a meaning, or a telos, or God, or the feeling of the absence of the good in 
the world is the region of necessity, and (2) that the absence of a meaning, or a telos, or 
God, or the feeling of the absence of the good in the world is affliction. The questions 
which call for consideration are: What is necessity? What is affliction? What is this 
absence of the meaning, or the good, or God?  Responses to each of the above questions 
are meant to serve as elucidations of those two correlated theses.  
To respond to these questions, I have used Simone Weil’s works, particularly, her 
Notebooks. 
12
  However, the task at hand has not been without some difficulties. The 
                                                          
8
 Allen and Springsted , Spirit, Nature, And Community, p. 33. 
9
  Weil, Oppression and Liberty, p. 159. 
10
 Ibid., p. 173. 
11
 Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction”, p. 171(emphasis added). 
12




notebooks present no system of idea and possess no explicit unity. What is needed is that 
those remarkable notes and letters be unfolded and the connection between them be 
traced out. Certainly, such an objective cannot be achieved without tireless attempt.  In a 
way, this might be considered as a contribution to the discussions of Weil’s works so long 
as methodology is concerned. I should also mention that since most of what Weil has 
written resonates with Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections, it would not be possible, 
at least for me, to think of Simone Weil except in connection with Wittgenstein and to a 
certain extent Kierkegaard. There are a lot of similarities between the two great spirits, 
not only in terms of their ways of thinking, but also in terms of their lives— with the 
exception that Weil was more radical than Wittgenstein in her faith and wrote more about 
religion than Wittgenstein did.   Surely, a philosophical approach (in my case, 
Wittgensteinian approach) is not the only way to approach an understanding of Weil.  
However, I have to acknowledge that it was through Wittgenstein that I came to have a 
better and clearer understanding of Simone Weil. 
 In terms of the content of this study, I have characterized a certain type of 
affliction, such as Christ’s crucifixion, as a ‘numinous experience’, a phrase which is used 
by Rudolf Otto.  According Otto, numinous experience contains a quite specific moment 
and which remains ineffable.
13
  Such a momentarily experience is the immediate 
apprehension of God’s presence in the form of absence. This characterization of affliction 
is what most of Weil’s scholars have failed to grasp. For example, although George Grant 
acknowledges the ineffability of affliction, he does not think affliction, for Weil, is 
ineffable in the sense that the it is immediate apprehension of God.
14
  My elucidation of 
                                                          
13
 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 5. 
14
 Grant, “Excerpts from Graduate Seminar Lectures, 1975-6”, p. 835.  
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Weil’s affliction, however, shows that Grant is mistaken in drawing the distinction 
between affliction and the immediate apprehension of God.  Before I elaborate further on 
our research questions and how we can make sense of Weil’s treatment of them, I will 
point out some important aspects of Weil’s life and thought, as well as some concerns that 
have been expressed by some scholars. This is important because it is virtually impossible 
to separate Weil’s intellectual character from her personal character.    
   
1.2. Why Weil?  
George Steiner mentions a Hassidic parable which tells us that God created humans so 
that humans might tell stories.  Steiner mentions that the telling of stories is what Claude 
Lévi-Strauss believes to be the very condition of our being.
15
  Thus, I will begin this 
section by telling a story about Simone Weil in order to bring out some further important 
aspects of her philosophical, ethical, and religious life and thought.  
On Weil, Czeslaw Milosz writes: “France offered a rare gift to the contemporary 
world in the person of Simone Weil. The appearance of such a writer in the twentieth 
                                                          
15
 Steiner, Nostalgia for an Absolute, p. 4-5. The Hassidic parable goes like this: 
When the great Rabbi Israel Baal Shem-Tov saw misfortune threatening the Jews it 
was his custom to go into a certain part of the forest to meditate. There he would 
light a fire, say a special prayer, and the miracle would be accomplished and the 
misfortune averted. Later, when his disciple, the celebrated Magid of Mezritch, had 
occasion, for the same reason, to intercede with heaven, he would go to the same 
place in the forest and say: "Master of the Universe, listen! I do not know how to 
light the fire, but I am still able to say the prayer." And again the miracle would be 
accomplished. Still later, Rabbi Moshe-Leib of Sasov, in order to save his people 
once more, would go into the forest and say: "I do not know how to light the fire, I 
do not know the prayer, but I know the place and this must be sufficient." It was 
sufficient and the miracle was accomplished. 
Then it fell to Rabbi Israel of Rizhyn to overcome misfortune. Sitting in his 
armchair, his head in his hands, he spoke to God: "I am unable to light the fire and I 
do not know the prayer; I cannot even find the place in the forest. All I can do is to 
tell the story, and this must be sufficient." And it was sufficient.  
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century was against all the rules of probability, yet improbable things do happen”.
16
  
According to her philosophy teacher, Émile Chartier, known as Alain, she is ‘the 
Martian’. Explained later, “she has nothing in common with us”.
17
  Obviously, we are 
confronted with someone who may not be rare, but is certainly remarkably brilliant and 
mad, and who has been considered by many to be one of the greatest religious minds and 
philosophers, as well as a political and social intellectual and activist.  After encountering 
Simone Weil, Simone de Beauvoir once said: ‘I envied a heart able to beat across the 
world’.
18
  She is, George Steiner also remarks, known as “the mad woman”,19 mad in 
virtually the same way as ‘Socrates [had] gone mad’.
20
  Weil is not thought to be mad 
because she tried to “live the truth of skepticism”,
21
  but because she tried to live the truth 
of certainty through faith.  Faith, Weil asserts, is “certainty”.
22
  Weil, of course, would not 
be alone in holding such a view; Wittgenstein (like Kierkegaard and others) also wrote 
once:  
We are in a sort of hell where we can do nothing but dream, roofed in, as it 
were, and cut off from heaven. But if I am to be REALLY saved, — what I 
need is certainty — not wisdom, dreams of speculation — and this certainty is 





                                                          
16
 Milosz, “The Importance of Simone Weil”, p. 85; Milosz won the 1980 Nobel Prize for 
Literature and translated the selected works of Weil into Polish in 1958. 
17
 McLellan, Utopian Pessimist, p. 17. 
18
 Quoted from Gray’s Simone Weil, p. 35. 
19
 Ibid., p. 171. This is what DeGaulle, a symbol of France’s resistance to oppression, 
said about Weil. Also see Fiori’s Simone Weil: An Intellectual Biography, p. 234. 
20
 Steiner, “Sainte Simone – Simone Weil”, p. 171. 
21
 “Hume pointed out, to try to live the truth of skepticism would be a form of madness”, 
see Jan Zwicky’s Lyric philosophy, Toronto, 1992, p. 96. 
22
 Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 138. 
23
 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 33; this is part of a longer passage where 
Wittgenstein meditates on Jesus’ resurrection. 
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There seems to be also a further reason to call her mad.  Like Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
her “type of thinking is not wanted in this present age; [therefore, she has] to swim so 
strongly against the tide”,
24
 in Weil’s case, against society, including institutional 
Christianity, which is analogous to Plato’s image of the Cave,
25
 the great beast— “The 
Great Beast is always loathsome”,
26
  and its “end is existence”.
27
 
According to Weil, the image of the Cave also indicates that “one begins by 
suffering, mental confusion, groping in the dark, effort that at times appears hopeless”
28
 
and absurd.  The Cave also, Weil elucidates further, “is concerned with finality. All we 
have are shadowy imitations of good”.
29
  Then, she writes: “We are chained down in the 
midst of society. Society is the Cave.  The way out is solitude… [and to] learn not to seek 
finality in the future”.
30
  That is to say, “[t]he human being can only escape from the 
collective by raising [themselves] above the personal and entering into the 
                                                          
24
 Once Wittgenstein said to his former student and close friend M. O’C. Drury: ‘My type 
of thinking is not wanted in this present age; I have to swim so strongly against the tide’. 
See (Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? By Norman Malcolm, edited with a 
response by Peter Winch, 1993). 
25
This is the most substantial parts of the allegory of Plato’s Cave:  
Imagine human beings living in an underground, cavelike dwelling, with an 
entrance a long way up, which is both open to the light and as wide as the 
cave itself. They’ve been there since childhood, fixed in the same place, with 
their necks and legs and fettered, able to see only in front of them, because 
their bonds prevent them from turning their heads around…When one of them 
was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look 
up toward the light, he’d be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things 
whose shadows he’d seen before. (Republic, book VII, Sec. 514a-514b, 515c). 
26
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.2, p. 482.  
27
 Ibid., p. 620. Weil mentions that “the beast in in the Apocalypse is sister to the great 
beast in Plato” See Weil’s Oppression and Liberty, p. 165. She also thought that “[t]he 
myth of the Cave is only comprehensible when considered in conjunction with that of the 
Great Beast”. See (The Notebooks v.2) p. 551. 
28
 Ibid., p. 362. 
29
 Ibid., p. 551. 
30
 Ibid., p. 593, 618. 
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impersonal…Our personality is the part of us which belongs to error and sin”.
31
 It is 
situated in this word which is governed by a blind necessity. Our impersonality, on the 
other hand, is the part of us which “is situated in the other world”.
32
 And this 
‘impersonality’ can only be reached by “the practice of a form of attention which is rare 
in itself and impossible except in solitude”.
33
   
This practice of a form attention, which is, for Weil, religious, requires what 
Kierkegaard, in Fear and Trembling, calls: ‘a teleological suspension of the ethical or the 
universal’. Kierkegaard writes: “The story of Abraham contains just such a teleological 
suspension of the ethical… [Abraham] acts by virtue of the absurd, for it is precisely the 
absurd that he as the single individual is higher than the universal [the ethical]”.
34
  
Furthermore, to come out of the cave or to be detached, in another word, means 
“to cease to make the future our objectives”.
35
  Weil also argues, seeking finality (i.e., 
overcoming evil or necessity) in the future is “the germ in Hegel, and consequently 
Marx”,
36
 as well as nearly all the enlightenment philosophers.  Such finality must be 
attained in the present. Weil writes: “The present does not attain finality.  Nor does the 
future, for it is only what will be present.  We do not know this, however. If we apply to 
the present the point of that desire within us which corresponds to finality, it pierces right 
through the eternal”.
37
  Thus, Weil argues, “eternity alone provides the cure”.
38
  So, the 
                                                          
31
 Weil, “Human Personality”, p. 320 and p. 318. 
32
 Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 136. 
33
 Weil, “Human Personality”, p. 318. 
34
 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 56. Kierkegaard is referencing the story of the 
sacrifice of Isaac by his father, Abraham as God required him. Kierkegaard says, 
Abraham had faith by virtue of the absurd “for it certainly was absurd that God, who 
required [Isaac] of him, should in the next moment rescind the requirement”(Ibid., p. 35).   
35
 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 20. 
36
 Weil, The Notebooks, v. 2, p. 616. 
37
 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 20. 
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absolute solitude or the total, spiritual alienation is possible only if one can alienate or 
uproot themselves from every human being, because, let us recall: “The reality of the 
world is the result of our attachment.  It is the reality of the self which we transfer into 
things”.
39
   
Furthermore, the image of the cave, in the metaphysical sense, refers to, one might 
say, relative “values. We only possess shadowy imitations of good”.
40
  For Simone Weil, 
as for Wittgenstein, the Good, in the “ethical or absolute sense”,
41
  which is not subject to 
necessity and chance must lie outside the world, outside of the space of facts.
42
  That is 
also why Socrates reminds us: “we should strive to flee from this world as quickly 
possible”,
43
 or, as Weil writes, strive “to flee to the next. But the door is shut. [And] to be 
able to enter in, and not be left on the doorstep [Weil states], one has to cease to be a 
social being”.
44
  Therefore, according to Weil, “accepting a death common to every 
human being liberates me from the dream of being a person”,
45
 being a social being. It is 
a kind of moral and social death of the “self”.   
This Weilian-Platonic view has not passed without some criticism. According to 
Martin Buber, Weil’s thoughts “express a strong and theologically far-reaching negation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
38
 Weil, The Notebooks, v. 2, p. 619. 
39
 Weil, Grave and Grace, p. 14. 
40
 Ibid., p. 51. 
41
 Wittgenstein, “Lecture on Ethics”, p. 38. Simone Weil sometimes capitalizes the 
conception of ‘good’ in an absolute sense of the term, (e.g., The Notebooks, v.2, p. 404-
5), and other times not, (e.g., Ibid., p. 436). 
42
 Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 139,  The Notebooks, v.1, p. 271, and The 
Notebooks, v.2, p.  436; also see Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
proposition (§6.41) and Wittgenstein’s Culture and Value, p. 3. 
43
 Weil’s own translation, see Weil’s “God in Plato”, p. 92. 
44
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.2, p. 466. 
45
 Vetö, The Religious Metaphysics of Simone Weil, p. 156-7. 
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of life, leading to the negation of the individual as well as of society as a whole”.
46
  Buber 
seems to accuse Weil of being a modern nihilist. Buber’s concern seems to be 
Nietzscheian in essence.
47
  There is a remark by Weil which seems to me to be a true, 
strong response to Buber’s charge against her. Weil writes: “I am not the girl who is 
waiting for her lover, but the tiresome third party who is sitting with two lovers and has 
got to get up and go away if they are to be really together”.
48
 
Furthermore, Gustave Thibon, who knew Simone Weil very well, reminds us that 
Weil’s “faith and detachment were expressed in all her actions… [And] her asceticism 
might seem exaggerated in our century”.
49
  In certain ways, her thoughts and life echo 
those of Socrates, Plato, St. Augustine, Kierkegaard, Pascal, and Wittgenstein.  Like 
Augustine, for example, Simone Weil was admonished to return into herself by the 
Platonic work,
50
 and just as the “inward struggle” put Augustine into “great agony”,
51
 or 
rather, into “the dark night of agony”,
52
 so too Simone Weil’s thoughts show traces of 
internal conflicts.  John M. Oesterreicher has reported that once he “saw in Simone a 
tormented and unhappy soul, of absolute sincerity, whose thoughts showed traces of 
internal conflicts”.
53
  She was truly living, as Gabriella Fiori has pointed out, “the ‘dark 
night’ of the world in her own body”.
54
  The dark night of the world, as George Grant has 
                                                          
46
 Buber, “The Silent Question: On Henri Bergson and Simone Weil”, p. 308. 
47
 In fact, Nietzsche traces the source of such nihilism back to the Platonic/Judeo-
Christian worldview.  
48
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.2, p. 404. 
49
 Thibon, “Introduction” to Gravity and Grace, p. ix. Thibon also tells us that every 
month, “she sent half her ration coupons to the political prisoners” (Ibid., p, x).   
50
 Augustine, Confession, p. 123. 
51
 Ibid., p. 174. 
52
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.2, P. 468. 
53
 Quoted in Fiori, Simone Weil: An Intellectual Biography, p. 239. Oesterreicher made 
this comment after having a long conversation with Simone Weil in New York. 
54
 Ibid., p. 242. 
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realized, is what ‘authentic theology’ must be studying.—“authentic theology must be a 
study where one is surrounded by the dark”.
55
  Also, like Kierkegaard, Pascal, and 
Wittgenstein, she has found her advantage in standing outside institutional Christianity, 
even more than Kierkegaard and Pascal did.
56
  Ironically, she felt “that it is necessary and 
ordained that [she] should be alone, a stranger and an exile in relation to every human 
circle without exception”.
57
   
But Weil was not motivated by a selfish desire to withdraw from every human 
context whatsoever, as Leslie Fiedler has pointed out.  Quite the opposite:      
 
She refused to be cut off from anyone, by refusing to identify herself 
completely with anyone or any cause...The most terrible of crimes is to 
collaborate in the uprooting of others in an already alienated world; but the 





Moreover, Simone Weil, who experienced infinite torment, was certainly and madly 
seeking infinite help and found refuge solely in the Christian faith. Indubitably, Weil 
agrees with Wittgenstein that “The Christian religion is only for the [one] who needs 
infinite help, solely, that is, for the [one] who experiences infinite torment”.
59
  Yet, and 
shockingly, Simone Weil reminds us that “[w]e must not weep so as not to be 
comforted”.
60
  Indeed, this frightening view of Weil is deep-rooted in her understanding 
of religion.  Religion, she stated once, “in so far as it is a source of consolation is a 
                                                          
55
 Quoted in Athanasiadis’ George Grant and the Theology of the Cross, p. 23. 
56
 Allen, Three Outsiders: Pascal. Kierkegaard. Simone Weil, p. 97. 
57
 Weil, “Letter II: Same Subject”, p. 54. 
58
 Fiedler, “Introduction” to Weil’s Waiting for God, p. 6, and p. 7. 
59
 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 46. 
60
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.1, p. 252. 
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hindrance to true faith”.
61
  It is not, then, surprising that “her vision is not comforting”,
62
 
or if it leaves us with a certain sense of moral discomfort and intellectual puzzle. That is 
also why one might not be surprised if she might even be called: a masochist.
63
 It is, 
however, misleading to identify her as a masochist. 
In any event, Weil is certainly a genius, a woman whom Albert Camus once 
described as “the only great spirit of our time”,
64
 a kind of genius akin to that of “the 
Saints”, T. S. Eliot says (as does Rush Rhees).
65
  The sign of “greatness and purity is 
found on every page of her work”,
66
  says Thibon.  As O’Connor says, there is nothing to 
stop the eye from gliding over all that cleverness and greatness found on every page of 
Weil’s writings.
67
  Evidently, her cleverness and greatness have emerged out of suffering.  
The suffering in question, Weil remarks in a letter to Joë Bousquet, a French poet, is 
“located at the very root of my every single thought, without exception”.
68
  Weil suffered 
under conditions intensified by her sensibility.
69
  As her brother, André Weil, one of the 
most influential mathematical theorists, tells us that Weil’s sensibility had gone ‘beyond 
the limits of the normal’.
70
 She was also as fearless as Socrates who believed that 
philosophy is the practice of dying”.
71
  Hence, “death”, and “not suicide,” is what is 
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required as Weil’s conception of de-creation suggests.
72
  That is to say, true faith, Weil 
would say, is the spiritual and moral practice of de-creating. This conception of ‘de-
creation’ will be clarified further later (p. 55-6).   
Although classifying Weil’s thoughts is difficult because “she remains 
unclassifiable”,
73
 or it would be virtually “impossible to find any label for her”,
74
 she has 
been labeled as: an Agnostic and Idealist (Morgan, 2005), Pessimist (Vance G. Morgan, 
2005, Richard Rees, 1970) —or rather, Utopian Pessimist (David McLellan, 1991), 
Uncompromising Transcendentalist (Richard Rees, 1970), and a quite Heterodox, even to 
the point of Gnosticism in the popular sense of that term (Springsted 1986).
75
  She, like 
Pascal and Kierkegaard, has also been described as an Outsider (Allen, 1983 & 
Springsted 1986), Augustinian (Springsted 1986), a Negative or Apophatic Theologian, 
Platonist (George Grant, Collected Works, 2009, Louis Dupre 2004) and a sort of 
Newtonian, Marxist, and may be a kind of Pantheist (Rush Rhees 1999),
76
 or not a 
Pantheist at all (Flannery O'Connor 1988),
77
  a sort of Dualist Metaphysician(Peter 
Winch 1989), or a Pragmatic Idealist (Richard  H. Bell 1993) Stoicism, Anarchical 
Individualism, Anti-Semitism, etc. are some other labels that have been ascribed to Weil, 
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  And, last but not least, Simone Weil is a Fideist (Kai 
Nielson 1967-89-2005).  
Notwithstanding the fact that these labels and terms, at least some of them, might 
be useful, though some are awkward, I am inclined to agree with Thibon that “in a sense 
she had all these tendencies; but she herself was something more, something different 
from them all”.
79
  In fact, what Wittgenstein says about the philosopher might best fit the 
characteristics of Simone Weil’s life and thought: Weil is a kind of a theologian and 
philosopher, one can say, who is not a “member of any community of ideas. That is what 
makes [her] into a philosopher”
80
 and an honest religious thinker. “An honest religious 
thinker [Wittgenstein tells us] is like a tightrope walker.  He [or she] almost looks as 
though he [or she] were walking on nothing but air. His [or her] support is the slenderest 
imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk on it”.
81
  Weil has also been mentioned to 
be “the example of the religious consciousness without a religion”
82
 or the example of, in 
Weil’s own terms, “implicit faith”,
83
 a kind of faith that goes beyond the boundaries of the 
Church.  
Furthermore, Weil did stay outside the Church because, as she thought, “[t]he 
Church has been a totalitarian Great Beast…The great Beast’s end is existence”.
84
  The 
Church, she believed, would separate her from ordinary people by a habit.
85
  There are so 
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many things that are outside it, including, for example, “materialism and atheism”.
86
  It 
also because, she thought, the Church is so “patriotic” 
87
  and collective.— “I do not want 
to be adopted into a circle, to live among people who say “we” and to be part of an “us,” 
to find I am at home in any human milieu 
 
whatever it may be.
88
  Yet, Simone Weil 
mentions that she is aware that “the Church must inevitably be a social structure; 
otherwise it would not exist. But in so far as it is a social structure, it belongs to the 
Prince of this World”.
89
  In spite of her refusal to enter the Church, Weil, as she states, 
could not help having a feeling that all the same she was really inside the Church.  One 
can say a great deal on this subject, but one has to limit oneself; I will mention two more 
factors.  First, Weil states that as water is indifferent to the objects that fall into it, so 
thought should be indifferent to all ideas without exception.
90
  No doubt, the second 
factor was philosophical difficulties that kept her outside philosophical community as 
well. In a letter written just a year before her death, Weil wrote: “But I am kept outside 
the Church by philosophical difficulties which I fear are irreducible”
91
 or insurmountable.   
Rush Rhees, the noted thinker trained by Wittgenstein, worries and complains that 
Simone Weil, specifically in her lectures at Roanne and especially in her writing about 
science between 1933 and1934, in Rhees’ own words, mixes up philosophy and religious 
meditations and therefore makes it difficult for us to know how we ought to look at her 
writings. Rhees writes:  
                                                          
86
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If it were just that Simone Weil wrote in religious meditation and not in 
philosophy, I should have no complaint. But I feel like complaining that she 
mixes up philosophy and religious meditation, and writes as if she were not 
even aware that she was doing so. She would tell me this shows how little I 
understand, and I am sure she would be right…But can someone tell me… 




Rhees mentions that his complaint against Weil’s philosophical perspectives on science 
would not be meant “as derogatory…She was [indeed] an important writer on political 
philosophy. But her greatness lay in her meditations on moral and religious questions”.
93
  
So, Rhees argues that because Simone Weil mixes up philosophy of science and religious 
mediations, she ignores and fails to draw any distinction between mathematical, physical, 
and moral necessity.
94
  That is why, Rhees believes that Weil is not a great philosopher of 
science though she is a talented philosopher of science and a great political, moral, and 
religious philosopher.  However, Rhees thinks, she might have become a very good 
philosopher of science if she had devoted herself to it. What Simone Weil wrote on 
science then is not philosophy but religious reflections. That is to say, Weil attempts to 
speak of science in the language that belongs to religious language.
95
 However, it is 
obvious that Rhees takes no notice of the distinction that Weil draws between physical 
and moral necessities.
96  
 In The Just Balance, Peter Winch expresses a similar complaint— that is, Simone 
Weil mixes up philosophy and religious meditations.  Simone Weil, Winch writes, had 
never discussed the distinction between questions that are philosophical and those that 
have some other character. But, unlike Rhees, Winch does not suggest that Simone Weil 
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should have done this, keeping the distinction between philosophy and religious 
meditations.
97
   
The question whether Weil’s remarks on science are philosophical or religious 
remarks, as first raised by Rhees, seems to be a serious difficulty.  Like Rhees and Winch, 
D. Z. Phillips draws our attention to the same concern; he states that anyone who has tried 
to study Weil’s work seriously “will have experienced the difficulty in distinguishing 
between her philosophical and religious observations”.
98
  The difficulty has been 
described by Phillips in the following way: “Language which may be acceptable as part 




This difficulty, I think, is grounded and drawn from Wittgenstein’s conception of 
language-games.  But, first, it should be said, as Rhees seems to ignore, that philosophy 
of science is not one of the natural sciences.  Furthermore, if, as Wittgenstein said once: 
“Philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry”,
100
 why could it not be 
written as a form of religious meditations?
101
  This does not necessarily mean to ignore 
where a particular discussion belongs.  Indeed, this difficulty needs to be acknowledged, 
as Winch remarks, in order to be able to determine how precisely a particular discussion 
is to be understood, and what kinds of criticism it is appropriate to develop in relation to 
it.
102
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1.3 The Enigma of Human Life:  Affliction 
This section provides a further background to our concerns regarding the problem of 
affliction, a concept which marks an important shift in Weil’s perspectives: a shift from 
political and social perspectives on suffering (the early Weil thought in terms of 




In her youth, Weil, as political and social philosopher, was intensively concerned 
with the oppression of the working class, who she saw as subject to a blind force: the 
social mechanism, and looked for a reply in Marxist literature.  In her book, Oppression 
and Liberty, Weil writes: 
Now the social mechanism, through its blind functioning, is in process…of 
destroying all the conditions for the material and moral well-being of the 
individual, all the conditions for intellectual and cultural development. To 
gain mastery over this mechanism is for us a matter of life and death…But 
how are we to master this blind force…? We should look in vain in Marxist 
literature for a reply to this question.
104
   
   
Although we are primarily concerned with Simone Weil’s later thought: her 
philosophical, moral, and religious solutions, not her political and social solutions, it is 
important for several reasons, as Springsted mentions, to note that Weil worked in three 
factories (1934-5), where she encountered the phenomenon she came to call affliction, for 
several reasons. The essential reason, according to Springsted, was “because she was not 
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satisfied with her [political and social] solutions to oppression”,
105
  the solutions 
(whatever they might be) that she was hoping to find in Marxist literature.  Therefore, she 
began to look for a solution outside the Marxist tradition. 
It is not our purpose to compare Weil’s early solutions to her later ones but to note 
that, as Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J. Seidler have pointed out, the experience of 
factory work led Weil to “give up thinking in terms of ‘oppression’ of working people”
106
  
and to start thinking in terms of affliction.  Moreover, it was from within “a reformulated 
Christianity”,
107
 primarily, “Greek Christianity”,
108
 along with Hinduism, and Greek 
philosophy and literature that Weil discovered a language that could begin to illuminate 
the truth of affliction as a serious and extreme form of suffering. That is also why in the 
beginning of this chapter we called her a strange Catholic.  
Furthermore, it is evident that the emphasis Simone Weil places on affliction and 
suffering is the most obvious link between her work and her affliction.  In his 
“Introduction” to his sympathetic reading of Weil, The Religious Metaphysics of Simone 
Weil (1994), Miklos Vetö writes: 
Naturally, Weil’s importance resides as much in the witness of her life as in 
the stunning fragments of her work, and this author would certainly be the last 
not to admire the fascinating greatness of this life: her unrelenting struggle 
with violent headaches; her heroic year in the factories; the months she spent 
working in the fields; the episode of the Spanish Civil War; her preoccupation 
with the refugee camps; and the tragic consummation of her life in a 
sanatorium near London. I am persuaded that anyone unaware of the 
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Leslie Fiedler makes a similar claim. He writes:  “In a profound sense, her life is her chief 
work, and without some notion of her biography it is impossible to know her total 
meaning”.
110
  This is particularly true of Weil’s philosophical, moral, and religious 
reflections on suffering and affliction, as well their interpretations and elucidations, since, 
as mentioned earlier, the link between her work and her affliction is evident and 
recognizable.  Following Vetö, “I have assumed such familiarity here”,
111
 and, indeed, 
without some familiarity with her life story, one may not be able to truly appreciate 
Weil’s “Utopian Pessimism”, to use David McClellan’s phrase, a kind of “pessimism”, 
Rees defines, that can evoke and stimulate and sustain a humane and realistic 
fortitude”.
112
  Whether it is true that Weil is a pessimist, there is still something important 
about pessimism. It shows, Rush Rhees claims, that “there can be no question of getting 
rid of evil”.
113
  That is to say, as Socrates claims in Theaetetus 176, “it is impossible that 
evil should disappear”.
114
  The following section illustrates why this is impossible.   
 
1.3.1 The Agony of Abandonment   
Therefore, this world in which we live, Weil standing against Gottfried Leibniz, is not the 
best possible world.
115
 — “God has created a world which is not the best possible, but 
which contains the whole range of good and evil.
116
  Doesn’t this, the existence of evil 
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and suffering, pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect and powerful 
God?  Although this, (i.e., theodicy), is not the problem with which I am concerned, it is 
extremely important to mention that, for Weil, “[b]ecause he is the creator, God is not all-
powerful”.
117
  He, “here below cannot be anything else but absolutely powerless”.
118
  
Creation, however, Weil proclaims, is “an abandonment” or “abdication”;
119
  it is 
“affliction”.
120
  Christ (also Job) suffered abandonment by God.  Moreover, Weil claims 
that this world in which we are is the world of “necessity and not purpose”;
121
 we are, 
according Weil, “in a state of misery”.
122
 Thus, as Springsted has put it, “we are already 
in a state of affliction—totally abandoned and in darkness”.
123
  Hence, it is reasonable to 
say, as David Cayley has put it, affliction is “the sign of our abandonment”.
124
  It is, as 
Athanasiadis has observed, nothing less than “the total loss of what makes us human in 
the world”;
125
 therefore, it is true to think with Wittgenstein and say:  to feel lost is the 
ultimate torment.
126
   
In The Love of God and Affliction, Simone Weil reminds us that the great enigma 
of human life is not suffering but affliction.  Thus, it is affliction, not what is so-called the 
problem of evil, (Why is there so much suffering?), with which this thesis is concerned.  
One may wonder whether one has to suffer, as Weil did, or “recreate Weil’s suffering in 
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 to understand and appreciate what Weil, specifically, wrote on affliction.  
Eric Springsted argues that such an imitation is unnecessary.
128
  All we have to do, 
Springsted, following Vetö, claims, is “to take seriously the fact that [her] vision was 
gained by suffering and that its truth cannot be divorced from suffering”.
129
  In a certain 
sense, Springsted is right, because, let us recall: “It is wrong to desire affliction…; and 
moreover it is the essence of affliction that it is suffered unwillingly”.
130
  Therefore, even 
if, per impossible, we could imitate affliction, we should not desire to recreate it in our 
own life to appreciate what Simone Weil wrote.  However, the question, which is crucial 
and will be discussed later in Chapter Three, (p. 75-82), and which Springsted ignores, is 
whether one can know and understand what affliction is without going through it. This is 
certainly related to Weil’s proclamation of the ineffability of affliction. 
Bearing this question in mind, my general suggestion regarding Simone Weil’s 
writings is to ‘look through’ not ‘at’ them; the only way to discern the thought is by re-
thinking them in our own mind.
131
  That is to say, her works, as Richard Bell has pointed 
out, should “serve as mirrors for us to see our own thinking, especially with all its 
deformities”.
132
  I also suggest that we should read Simon Weil in a contra modern 
fashion—that is, her later reflections should be read as a reinvigoration of ancient 
approaches, specifically Plato.  In Plato’s allegory of the cave, Weil writes: “The sun in 
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Plato being the good, darkness represents affliction in the myth of the cave”.
133
  However, 
Weil returns to ancient tradition, particularly, to the Socratic-Platonic tradition, for a 
fundamental reason lying behind her world-view: “When a man [a human] introduces a 
new thought into philosophy it can hardly be anything except a new accent upon some 
thought which is not only eternal by right but ancient in fact”.
134
   Thus it must not be a 
surprise to say Weil seems to concerns herself with a traditional, eternal, yet elapsed, 
question.  Here, it is worthwhile to pay attention to how Erik Fromm spoke to this issue: 
[Humans]— of all ages and cultures—[are] confronted with the solution of 
one and the same question: the question of how to overcome separateness, 
how to achieve union , how to transcend one’s own individual life…The 
question is the same for primitive man living in caves…the roman soldier, the 
medieval monk , the Japanese samurai, the modern clerk and factory hand. 
The question is the same, for it springs from the same ground: the human 
situation, the conditions of human existence. The answer varies. The question 
can be answered by animal worship, by human sacrifice or military conquest, 
by indulgence in luxury, by ascetic renunciation, by obsessional work, by 
artistic creation, by the love of God, and by the love of [humans]. While there 
are many answers…as soon as one ignores smaller differences…one 
discovers that there is only a limited number of answers…The history of 




This separateness, in Weil’s sense, is an infinite gap or distance between blind necessity 
and the good
136
 or “its equivalent, that between justice and force”,
137
 or, in other words, 
“between reality and the good”,
138
  the absolute or the ‘supernatural good’,
139
  a good, as 
Athanasiadis has put it, “which is the hidden desire deep in our souls”.
140
 We, Weil 
claims, are just “a point in this distance. Space, time, and the mechanism that governs 
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matter are the distance.  Everything that we call evil is only this mechanism”.
141
  What 
brings us into this distance is a blind necessity, as she writes: “Only blind necessity can 
throw [humans] to the extreme point of distance, close to the Cross”.
142
  Yet, for those 
“who love, separation, although painful, is a good”.
143
  Weil regards the Cross as a 
paradigm of affliction, as a universal human experience.  Hence, she says: “The Cross [or 
affliction] is this point of intersection”
144
 between necessity and the good. 
More importantly, Weil identifies this distance, the infinite distance between 
necessity and the good, as “the fundamental contradiction”:
145
 The essential contradiction 
in human life.  Hence, the fundamental contradiction, which is equivalent to the notion of 
condition of existence, is “the sole link between good and necessity”.
146
  Moreover, it is 
in affliction that one is more likely to experience this distance or separateness.  In other 
words, one of the keys by which Simone Weil unlocked her understanding of the 
contradiction is the experience of affliction which is, as Vetö has observed, located as an 
“obstacle at the intersection of…the good and necessity”.
147
 It seems to be obvious that 
Simone Weil is concerned with the tension in the separateness and connectedness of 
necessity and the good.  This, according to Thibon, is her “metaphysical explanation of 
abandonment”.
148
   
Indeed, Weil’s claim, the proclamation of the contradiction between necessity and 
the good, is not novel; it has been building up for centuries.  Even as far as back, as Weil 
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herself states, to Plato, there is the sense that “an infinite distance separates the good from 
necessity”.
149
  Thus, the deepest need is the need to overcome this separateness; and the 
question is: What is Weil’s response?  This is the question which I am hoping to make 
clear through this study. 
 
1.4 Weil’s Philosophical Aim 
Moreover, for Weil, affliction is something essentially different from suffering; it is 
something specific, irreducible.
150
  Affliction, Weil writes, is “impossible to compare with 
anything else, just as nothing can convey the idea of sound to the deaf and dumb”.
151
  It 
shows an insoluble contradiction which our mind tries to overcome and is unable to.
152
  
Therefore, Weil would say: “The proper method of philosophy consists in clearly 
conceiving the insoluble problems in all their insolubility and then in simply 
contemplating them, fixedly and tirelessly…without any hope, patiently waiting”.
153
  In 
some other places, Simone Weil wrote that the proper or correct method would really be 
nothing, but attaining clarity.  That is to say, in Weil’s own terms, “[t]he intelligence is 
not called upon to discover anything, but merely to clear the ground”.
154
  This is precisely 
what Wittgenstein also thought to be the correct method of philosophy.   
What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are 
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Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 





For Weil too, the intelligence, not only has nothing to explain, but even nothing to 
discover. The idea of wanting to explain affliction is perhaps wrong.  Thus, our main task 
is to strive for clarification and contemplation, rather than for explanation or any answer, 
since the question of affliction, as Weil argues, is the question to which there is 
essentially no answer or explanation.
157
  In this way, what affliction cries out for is a pure 
or unmixed attention and contemplation, rather than an explanation.  
Finally, it should be admitted that Weil’s reflections on affliction, is quite a novel 
idea. It is one of the concepts which are most important to Weil and is the most common 
feature of human life. Again, the primary objective of this thesis is to clarify what Weil 
means by necessity and affliction. This thesis also attempts to clarify what Weil means by 
the ineffability of affliction, and, more importantly, to elucidate why she finds 
consolation to be a hindrance to true faith. I also suggest that, for Simone Weil, affliction 
is not an intellectual problem.  Therefore, following Wittgenstein, “what has to be 
overcome is not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will”.
158
  That is, what has to be 
overcome, in order that we understand Weil, is: the willing subject who resists consent to 
necessity and affliction. According to Weil, “[t]he resistance to be overcome in order to 
be carried toward the beautiful [or the good] is perhaps a test of authenticity”.
159
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1.5 Research Design 
I will discuss Weil reflections on suffering, affliction, and necessity in the language that 
belongs to philosophical, moral, political, and religious landscape, for, as Springsted (as 
well as McLellan) has pointed out, affliction, for Weil, is a moral and religious 
problem.
160
  Like Eric Springsted, I also believe that “a psychological reductionism will 
not do these writings justice any more than it would do justice to the works of Augustine, 
Kierkegaard or Dostoevsky”.
161
  Nor does a sociological or physical reductionism help us 
to understand what Weil essentially means by affliction, although the social factor, as 
Weil says, is essential amongst all its parts, physiological and physical.
162
  
Reductionism appearing in a variety forms,
163
 is the dominant modern approach 
striving for a total explanation. Certainly, this craving is something that Weil rejects. She 
saw explanation as a hindrance to truth.  Thus, no form of reductionism seems to be 
adequate to the task at hand for Weil as well as for us.  
 This thesis not only clarifies Weil’s, primarily, later, non-systematic, and often 
unclear, thought, but it also argues that affliction cannot be understood apart from her 
conception of necessity. The concept of necessity and affliction are, in fact, closely linked 
in Weil’s writings. We experience necessity as affliction.  The idea is that affliction 
                                                          
160
 Springsted, Simone Weil and the Suffering of Love, p. 35; also see McLellan’s Simone 
Weil: Utopian Pessimist, p. 30. 
161
 Springsted, Simone Weil and the Suffering of Love, p. 7. 
162
 Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction”, p. 171. 
163
 According to Huston Smith, “reductionists, who being primarily interested in 
something other than religion, reduce religion to a manifestation or expression of this or 
that other entity: social reality (Durkheim), class struggle (Marx), ontogenetic 
development (Freud)… [On the other hand] Phenomenologists believe in religion’s 
autonomy… Kant located the irreducibility of religious in the moral imperative, 
Schleiermacher in man’s feeling of absolute dependence, Rudolf Otto in his sense of the 
numinous”; See the introduction to the revised edition to The Transcendent Unity of 
Religion, p. xxi. 
28 
 
cannot be separated from necessity, gravity, or force and vice versa.  Therefore, the key 
themes in our investigations of the enigma of human life, i.e., of the affliction, will also 
include necessity. I am forced by my guiding questions, ‘What is necessity?’ ‘What is 
affliction?’ ‘What is this absence of the meaning, or the good, or God?’ to divide this 
thesis into two more chapters, apart from the concluding chapter.  
In Chapter 2, I will explore and clarifies the thesis that the absence of a meaning, 
or God, or the feeling of the absence of the good in the world is the region of necessity. I 
will begin this chapter (Sec. 2.1) by throwing light on the conception of necessity and 
argue that Weil’s identification of necessity, as a mathematical and blind mechanical 
necessity is the key to understanding of affliction, a momentarily experience of God’s 
absence or  of the good which lies beyond the region of necessity. The main point of this 
section is to show that reality is a blind necessity, and things have causes and not 
purposes. The problem is whether necessity can calm someone who is in pain—Why am I 
being hurt? I will consider this problem as a metaphysical, ethical, or religious difficulty, 
the difficulty of failing to stop asking for purposes, or the difficulty of failing to prevent 
oneself from asking the same question—Why? This will allow us to view Weil’s ethical 
and religious perspectives in sections: (2.2.2 and 2.2.3). It will help us to understand the 
essential difference between necessity, which the foundation of the empirical reality, and 
the good, which is the foundation of the transcendental reality. Once the essential 
difference between necessity and the good is clarified, Weil thesis, that the absence of a 
meaning, or God, or the good in the world is the region of necessity, will become more 
lucid and comprehensible. Finally, (2.3), since Weil’s account of necessity suggests that 
there is no answer to a teleological question, (Why am I being hurt?), I will clarify 
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whether Simone Weil is an absurdist. The point to consider Weil’s absurdism is to 
recapture her religious and ethical perspectives through Kierkegaard.   
It should be noticed that before moving on to the last two sections, (2.2.2 and 
2.2.3), I will reconsider the term necessity, (Sec. 2.1.1), through examining Rush Rhees’ 
and Peter Winch’ criticism of Weil’s identification of necessity, mainly, for the purpose 
of further clarification. Unlike Rhees and Winch, I will argue that Simone Weil maintains 
more than one notion of necessity. Rhees’ and Winch’s criticism is important to be 
considered since, as we mentioned, Weil’s conception of necessity is the key term to 
understanding of affliction.  
Chapter 3 reconsiders the same issue, the essential differences between necessity 
and the good, but from a slightly different direction, through affliction.  In other words, in 
Chapter 3, I will explore and clarify the thesis, that the absence of a meaning, or God, or 
the feeling of the absence of the good in the world, is affliction. In this chapter, I will 
address and answer four major questions: What is affliction is? Can affliction be known 
and explained? Can affliction be articulated? Is there a possibility of expressing it? 
In Sec. 3.1, I will clarify Weil’s conception of affliction and characterizes it as a 
quite specific moment of ‘a numinous experience’, a kind of momentarily experience 
which remains ineffable.   I will also argue that affliction can only be known by negation. 
That is, what affliction is not—affliction is not suffering. This will led me to the second 
question (Sec. 3.2).  Here, I explain, by providing some reasons, why Weil refuses any 
form of explanation and consolation for suffering, or rather affliction. Answers to the first 
two questions will drive me to Sec. 3.2, where I expand on Weil’s claim of the 
ineffability or inarticulateness of affliction.  The final question in guiding us in the final 
section (3.2.1) will allow us to put forward a Weilian response for expressing what is 
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apparently inexpressible in affliction. I conclude this chapter by claiming that what is 
ineffable or inexpressible, God, or the good, can be communicated and expressed by 
means of indirect expressions, by means of a simile. The final Chapter sums up the thesis 
and proposes a potential concern: Should one not call Weil: an anti-historical, or a non-


























Understanding the nature of necessity and the good is crucial for understanding Weil’s 
account of affliction, for they are correlated. Neither can be grasped fully without the 
other.  Together, they illuminate what she means by affliction.  Suffering, grief, torment, 
and misfortune, inflicted by blind necessity, characterize human life. A person who falls 
into affliction, Weil claims, is like a 'workman who gets caught up in a machine’, a 
machine that is ruled by ‘necessity’ which she calls: ‘a blind mechanism’. The afflicted 
person, Weil states, is ‘no longer a [human] but a torn and bloody rag on the teeth of a 
cogwheel’.
164
  He or she who is wounded and afflicted in this way at the hands of a blind 
force is “inert and lifeless. He [or she] goes unnoticed, or nearly unnoticed, by those who 
pass him [or her] by”.
165
  In such a scenario, the cry of the afflicted person is always 
“inaudible: ‘Why am I being hurt?’”,
166
 a question to which there is no answer.
167
  This 
picture is an illustration of what necessity, as a blind force, is. This picture can be restated 
in the following way:  The absence of a meaning, God, or the good in the world is the 
region of necessity. This is the thesis with which this chapter is concerned.   
What necessity is in the work of Simone Weil is no easy question in the sense that 
Weil has never drawn a sharp distinction between different senses of necessity. For 
example, she does not appear to explain how moral necessity is different from physical 
necessity. For that reason, she has been criticized by, primarily, some Wittgensteinian 
                                                          

 It should be reminded that Simone Weil occasionally capitalizes “necessity” for the 
purpose of emphasising on the term.   
164
 Weil, “Human Personality” p. 331 & “The Love of God and Affliction”, p. 175. 
165
 Athanasiadis, George Grant and the Theology of the Cross, p. 91. 
166
 Weil, “Human Personality” p. 329. 
167
 Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 82-3. 
32 
 
scholars such as Rush Rhees and Peter Winch.  Since having a clear understanding of 
Weil’s notion of necessity is crucial for understanding her notion of affliction, we cannot 
overlook Rhees’ and Winch’s criticism. Based upon her understanding of necessity, Weil 
might also be called absurdist.
168
   
According to Weil, affliction reveals the essential contradiction in the human 
condition: the infinite distance between necessity and the good. Weil writes: “The 
necessity contained in this contradiction represents the whole of Necessity [sic] in a 
nutshell”.
169
  However, according to Weil, ‘we are subject to necessity, and crave for the 
good, and/or we are subject to force, and crave for justice’.
170
  Above all, it is this 
contradiction Weil most concerns herself with and views as puzzling. That is why “[t]he 
blind necessity which constrains us, and which is revealed in geometry, appears to us as a 
thing to overcome”.
171
  To overcome the blind necessity is to overcome the distance or 
gap between necessity and the good since, for Weil, I believe, these two themes are 
intrinsically interconnected.  
Weil’s views on this fundamentally ‘metaphysical problem’ largely depend on her 
understanding of how the essence of necessity is different from that of the good.  In fact, 
she continually asks and comes back to this question.
172
  Therefore, shedding light upon 
what Weil means by necessity and how its essence is different from that of the good 
should help us to reach a deeper understanding of affliction.  Before I spell out her 
account of necessity and make it clear by referring to Wittgenstein, it should be 
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acknowledged that, as Steven Burns has observed, “[t]he necessity which Weil insists” is 
not “the determinist or deductive-explanation thesis any more than it is the indeterminist 
or contingent thesis”.
173
  Arguably, I believe, this is true of Weil, but since this topic of 
determinism against free will is beyond the scope of this thesis, I will leave the issue at 
that.  
However, the purpose of this chapter is to clarify the thesis that the absence of a 
meaning, God, or the good in the world is the region of necessity by clarifying the 
difference between what is necessity and what is good.  I will argue that Weil’s 
identification of a blind, mechanical necessity is the key to understanding affliction, an 
experience of the good which lies beyond the region of necessity.  In Sec. 2.1, I will 
throw light on Weil’s conception of necessity and demonstrate the importance and role of 
necessity as the major key in Weil philosophical, ethical, and religious approach to 
understanding affliction. In order to clarify Weil’s conception of necessity further, I will 
consider a serious criticism raised by Rush Rhees and Peter Winch against Weil in Sec. 
2.2.1.  Against Rhees’ and Winch’s criticism, I will argue in this section that Simone 
Weil holds more than one notion of necessity. In other words, there are different senses of 
necessity present in Weil’s thought.  To understand Weil’s insistence on the essential 
difference between necessity and the good, we need to consider her ethical and religious 
views. This is the main objective of the following two sections (2.2.2 and 2.2.3).  Finally, 
since, for Weil, reality is the sole necessity, lack any purpose, then, as I discuss in 
Sec.2.3, in what sense Weil might be characterized as an absurdist if she is at all. 
However, let us begin this chapter by spelling out what necessity is.    
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2.1 The Domain and Chain of Necessity 
 
 
Throwing light on Weil’s philosophical conception of necessity and showing the key role 
of necessity as the basis for understanding affliction is the primary objective of this 
section.  
According to Simone Weil, this sensible world in which we live has no other 
reality than that of necessity.
174
  Hence, the reality of this world is necessity; it is the act 
or realization of necessity. In a word, necessity is reality or vice versa. Everything that 
exists within or beneath the world is subjected to necessity or the related term, 
“gravity”.
175
  Weil also remarks that “the matter which constitutes the world is a tissue of 
blind necessity”.
176
  The reality of matter, Weil asserts, “lies in necessity, but we can only 
conceive of necessity by laying down clearly defined conditions, that is to say in 
mathematics”.
177
  Therefore, Weil states: “Mathematical necessity is certainly genuine 
necessity”.
178
 It is genuine in the sense that it is impersonal, “No points of view”, 
179
  “No 
‘I’ in numbers”.
180
  It tells us what must necessarily be, e.g., 2+2 must necessarily be 4.  
Thus, it is indifferent to one’s beliefs and desires.  Mathematical necessity is also genuine 
in the sense that “I cannot visualize a relation between e and π”.
181
  It should also be 
mentioned that, at least in some cases, Weil uses ‘mathematical necessity’ as an 
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  That is to say, as she claims, “[w]e are better able to seize upon the fact of 
Divine Providence in mathematics”,
183
 mathematical objects are formless.   
Moreover, mathematical necessity forms the basis of reality. That is, this 
mathematical necessity is “the substance of the world”
184
 or reality; it is “a solid 
reality”.
185
  Nevertheless, it is not “tangible”; it can only be felt “in the form of blows”.
186
 
In other words, “we can be aware of necessity as constraint and constraint as a pain”.
187
  
Moreover, “necessity”, like “good”, Weil asserts, “come to us from outside”.
188
  That is to 
say it is independent of one’s beliefs and desires.    
Weil also states that necessity is the “supreme criterion of logic”.
189
  Thus, it must 
be regarded “as being that which imposes conditions”,
190
 or “an order of conditions”.
191
  
Weil also seems to suggest that the notion of possibility is inherent in necessity. 
Necessity, she writes, is “made up of conditions, therefore of possibilities”;
192
 it “leaves 
room for ‘ifs’”.
193
 Things are linked together, or combined with one another, in 
innumerable ways, by necessity.
194
 Therefore, according to Weil,  
What must necessarily be, that is precisely what is. 





                                                          
182
 The role of analogy in Weil’s thought is discussed further on (p. 48-50).  
183
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.2, p. 526. 
184
 Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 80 & p. 92. 
185
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.2, p. 410. 
186
 Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 88 & p. 92. 
187
 Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction”, p. 171. 
188
 Weil, Weil, The Notebooks, v.2, p. 515. 
189
 Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 124. 
190
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.1, p. 217. 
191
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.2, p. 480. 
192
 Ibid., p. 482. 
193
 Ibid., p. 410. 
194
 Weil, The Notebooks, v.1, p. 303, 302. 
195
 Ibid., p. 172. 
36 
 
In short, “[t]hings must be so…, and, precisely, they are so”.
196
  In The Notebooks, 
v.2, Weil considers Beaumarchais’ question “Why these things and not others?”  
Like Wittgenstein, Weil could say: ‘In the word, things fit into one another like the 
links of a chain and stand in a determinate relation to one another’.
197
   
Furthermore, Weil writes: “[n]ecessity can only be perfectly conceived 
when the relations appear as perfectly immaterial”,
198
 as mathematical relations.—
“Two things linked together by Necessity [sic]”.
199
 So, it is clear that “necessity 
appears to her above all as mathematical. That is, as a network of immaterial 
relations”.
200
 According to Weil, as Grant has pointed out, those pure, immaterial, 
or mathematical relations are “the essence of everything that is”.
201
  
Moreover, in her Lectures on Philosophy, Weil states that “necessity is prior to 
experience. Necessary connections are the conditions of experiences; they give to it the 
form without which experience would only be a mass of sensations”.
202
  In other words, 
without necessity, the world would be a chaos.  This also explains why Weil makes such 
a strong statement:  “Only necessity is an object of knowledge”.
203
   
Furthermore, this Weilian idea of necessity, as the links of a chain, is related 
to a teleological question as well:  Is there any purpose in the way things are? It 
seems to be obvious that Weil denies that there is any— that is to say, things that 
are linked together by necessity lack purpose. In her essay, “Forms of the Implicit 
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Love of God”, Weil explains this more clearly by writing: "The question of 
Beaumarchais: "Why these things rather than others?" never has any answer, 
because the world is devoid of finality. The absence of finality is the region of 
necessity. Things have causes and not ends".
204
  In other words, the absence of a 
purpose or a telos, as well of meaning, in the world is the region of necessity. 
According to Weil, to ask ‘why these things rather than others?’ is, by analogy, the 
same as to ask:“[W]hy such and such a word in poem is in such and such a place”? 
Argued further: “[I]f there is any answer, either the poem is not of the highest order 
or else the reader has understood nothing of it”. The only legitimate answer can be 
given is that "the word is there because it is suitable that it should be. The proof of 
this suitability is that it is there and that the poem is beautiful. The poem is 
beautiful, that is to say the reader does not wish it other than it is"
205
 and full stop.  
“The beautiful is that which we cannot wish to change”.
206
  Weil is aware that 
“[t]he difficulty here is to stop”,
207
  to stop oneself from asking or searching for 
explanation or any proof.  Now, one may wonder how this notion of ‘beauty’ is 
connected to our discussion of necessity.  
According to Weil, “[b]eauty is necessity”.
208
 That is, beauty is also rooted 
in necessity. For Weil, “beauty and reality are identical”.
209
  The beautiful in nature, 
Weil reminds us, is “a union of the sensible impression and of the sense of 
necessity. Things must be like that (in the first place), and, precisely, they are like 
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  This union, for Weil, is “Pythagorean harmony”.
211
  Therefore, as 
Athanasiadis has stated, we can say:  
 
While the world appears to be ruled by brutal necessity or force, there is also 
another side to it, another way of looking at it. The world is also beautiful. 
Beauty is an incarnation of divine love in the world. Weil has no hesitation 
equating beauty with the Logos incarnate in the world. Here, biblical 
conceptions of love and Platonic conceptions of beauty come together. Beauty 
is that which draws our love…Beauty draws us out of ourselves and inspires 





The attitude of looking, “the mere turning of the head toward God”,
213
  beyond 
ourselves, according to Weil, is “the attitude which corresponds with the 
beautiful”.
214
  It is also important to notice that, for Weil, “It is impossible to 
penetrate the good without penetrating the beautiful”.
215
  Like the supernatural 
good, what is beautiful can only be desired.   
Furthermore, someone may say that Weil’s claim, ‘Things must be like that, 
and, precisely, they are like that’, requires an ontological proof.  
In Weil’s view, “[o]ntological proof is mysterious because it doesn’t address 
itself to the intelligence, but to love”.
216
  In other words, it is ‘related to “love and 
not to affirmation and denial”.
217
  The role of “the intelligence—that part of us 
which affirms and denies and formulates opinions—is merely to submit. All that I 
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conceive of as true is less true than those things of which I cannot conceive the 
truth, but which I love”.
218
  Love is a negative virtue. It is also to be exercised, not 
to be thought.  Love is the recognition and acceptance of a necessity in the world.  
To say love is a negative virtue is to say what we love is not God or good.  Yet, 
according to Weil, the only way to love God is by negation, by loving what is not 
God or good.  That is, the only way to love God is to love necessity, to consent to 
necessity regardless of its kinds: ugly (suffering and affliction) and beauty (nature).  
 But why do we still ask or search for a proof?  Because suffering, the ugly 
face of necessity, Weil states, induces a feeling of horror in which there is nothing 
to love and therefore prevent us from seeing what is mysterious and beautiful.  But, 
the word is not mysterious because we have not yet found a legitimate answer or 
explanation, but that its mysteriousness is its very essence. Weil reminds us: “The 
notion of mystery is legitimate when the most logical and most rigorous use of the 
intelligence leads to an impasse, to a contradiction which is inescapable in this 
sense”.
219
  Yet, and remarkably, Simone Weil would state that such a mystery, 
when severed from all reason, is no longer a mystery but an absurdity.
220
   
In short, in this section, I have spelled out Weil’s ontological understanding 
of reality through her philosophical understanding of necessity. I have argued that 
reality is governed by a blind, mechanical necessity. I have also demonstrated that 
necessity, as the links of a chain, is related to a teleological question: What is the 
purpose(s) behind the way things are in the world? The answer, which was given by 
Weil, is that things have causes and not ends.  But this answer, though it is an 
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accurate one, does not satisfy someone who is in affliction. Hence, I pointed to a 
difficulty of preventing oneself from asking the same question constantly—Why? 
This question or difficulty can be characterized as a metaphysical, or ethical, or 
religious difficulty. The upcoming sections will investigate this further. 
 
2.2 Necessity and the Good

  
The main objective of this section is to clarify some significant, yet odd, aspects of Weil’s 
ethics which are inseparable from those of her religious views. The main reason for 
considering Weil’s ethical view is to clarify the essential differences between necessity 
and the good.  I should also mention that because Weil’s ethical approach echoes 
Wittgenstein’s voice in some important ways, I will refer to Wittgenstein for the purpose 
of making Weil’s ethical and religious suggestions more explicit.  Nevertheless, I begin 
this section by Rhee’s and Winch’s concern regarding Weil’s conception of necessity.  
 
2.2.1 Rhees’ Concern 
As mentioned in the opening paragraph of this chapter, understanding the nature of 
necessity and the good is crucial for understanding Weil’s account of affliction, for they 
are all correlated.  Even so, both Rush Rhees and Peter Winch have found Weil’s account 
of necessity to be problematic and confusing. If this is true, then Weil’s account of 
affliction must also be confusing. Therefore, it is important to assess this concern.   
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This is a challenging criticism yet extremely useful in order to clarify further Weil’s 
conception of necessity.  Although it is a fair criticism, it can be avoided, not by ignoring 
it, but by asking why Weil speaks as if there were only a single necessity.  Some remarks 
appearing in Weil’s works appear to show different senses of necessity and provide a 
persuasive justification for why Weil seems to speak of different forms of necessity in 
nearly the same manner.  
Both Rhees and Winch make a comparison between Weil’s account of necessity 
and that of the early Wittgenstein based upon Wittgenstein’s proclamation of the 
exclusiveness of logical necessity: the only necessity that exists is logical necessity.
221
  
Rhees, for instance, says: Weil writes as though necessity were one thing: ‘mechanical 
necessity’; she seems to be speaking as Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus when he said 
“there is only logical necessity”.
222
  Winch has made a similar comparison. He writes: 
“There are however some very striking analogies between the ways in which they [both 
Wittgenstein and Weil] conceive necessity”.
223
  Moreover, Rhees’ and Winch’s main 
objective of the comparison, surprisingly, is to criticize Weil’s account of necessity. I say 
‘surprisingly’, here, since they criticize Weil but not Wittgenstein, and they seem to resist 
recognizing a different, though undeveloped, sense of necessity that can be found in 
Weil’s works such as: mathematical, physical, social, political, and moral. 
For example, Rhees claims that if we look at Weil’s conception and analysis of 
‘necessity’ from a philosophical point of view, it seems to be confusing. Rhees argues 
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that the “refusal to recognise a different sense of the word ‘necessity’ is confusing”.
224
  
That is to say, Weil, Rhees claims, ignores, or rather refuses to recognize a fundamental 
difference between mathematical, physical, and moral necessity.
225
  Likewise, Winch 
remarks that Simone Weil tended much more so in her later writings, to speak of the 
whole natural order as subject to a single necessity.  In speaking this way, Winch believes 
that “[Weil] tended, rather like Spinoza, to confuse the senses of ‘necessity’ which apply 
to the natural laws established within science, with the fundamentally different sense of 
‘necessity’ connected with ideas like ‘fate’”.
226
   
I will speak to both Winch’s and Rhees’ concerns together since they express and 
confirm virtually the same concern. 
 First, it is crucial to note that, according to Weil, only part of a human being is 
subject to necessity. She writes:  “The part of [a human] which is in this world is the part 
which is in bondage to necessity and subject to the misery of need”.
227
  The eternal part of 
human, Weil argues, is not subject to “the pitiless necessity of matter and the cruelty of 
the devil”.
228
  This certainly suggests the difference between natural phenomena and, for 
instance, moral or metaphysical phenomena.  Moreover, Rhees himself, for example, 
earlier (in the same lecture) quotes Weil when she says, “‘moral phenomena …are not 
subject to physical necessity, but they are subject to necessity’”.
229
 This necessity, 
according to Weil, is a moral form of necessity. 
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The wretchedness of our condition subjects human nature to a moral form of 









However, the above two claims together obviously imply a distinction, a different 
sense of the term “necessity”, though it might still be vague. But it is not clear why Rhees 
ignores this obvious distinction that Weil draws between moral and non-moral 
phenomena.  Rhees (as well as Winch) could, however, have said that Weil had not 
clarified what she meant by moral necessity, rather than saying Weil has failed to 
recognize different sense of necessity. It seems to me that there is a family of conception 
of necessity: moral, political, social, historical, et cetera.   
Second, for Weil, what is important, as she asserts, is the recognition of a 
necessity in all facts, including human facts, regardless of kind.  She writes: “All concrete 
knowledge of facts, including human facts, is the recognition of a necessity in them, 
either a mathematical necessity or something analogous”.
232
 Nonetheless, Weil still 
speaks of moral, social, and political, and natural phenomena as though they all were the 
same and all subject to mathematical necessity.  This is true and that is why her 
conception of necessity could be confusing and therefore misleading in the ways 
illustrated by the critiques of Rhees and Winch. 
What needs to be made clear is that despite the fact that Simone Weil finds 
the recognition of a necessity in all facts to be essential, her investigation of 
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necessity does not consist in grasping one comprehensive essence of the term. The 
main reason Weil insists on the conception of necessity is, as she would say, “to 
bring to light that which lies outside its range”:
233
 the absolute good which is, 
according to her, hidden from us and is more real.
234
  What is real for us, Weil 
states, is “what we are unable to deny and yet which escapes our grasp”.
235
  It is 
evident that Weil sees necessity as the key to understanding and justifying the 
authority the absolute good has over us.  
To summarise this section, unlike Rush Rhees and Peter Winch, I have argued that 
there is more than a single necessity in Weil’s thought. Indeed, Weil maintains a family 
of conceptions about necessity.  Apart from physical, for a lack of a better term, a non-
physical necessity such as moral, political, social, and spiritual necessities are also 
essential to Weil’s thought and play a crucial role in shaping her metaphysical and moral, 
as well her political and social thought.
236
  However, what is most important to bear in 
mind is that Weil’s aim in investigating necessity is to bring to light that which lies 
outside its domain.   
At the end of Sec. 2.1, I pointed to a difficulty of stopping oneself from asking the 
why-question. It was mentioned that this difficulty can be characterized as a 
metaphysical, or ethical, or religious difficulty, and this is what we will investigate further 
in sections (2.2.2 and 2.2.3). 
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2.2.2 Weil’s Ethical and Religious Perspectives 
Weil’s ethical and religious views are inseparable. As mentioned earlier, (p. 40), the main 
reason for considering Weil’s ethical view is to clarify the essential differences between 
necessity and the good. Otherwise, having a clear understanding of Weil’s views on of 
affliction would be impossible. 
According to Weil, it is not our body alone that is thus subject to a blind 
mechanical necessity, but all our thoughts as well.
237
  She writes: “All men are subject to 
gravity [i.e., necessity], in spite of the fact that, in the case of certain sages or saints, we 
hear tales, whether true or not, of levitation or of walking upon water”.
238
  That is to say, 
everything in the world takes place exclusively in accordance with the domain of 
necessity, the blind mechanical chain of necessity. Yet, we desire and crave for the good: 
“the longing for an absolute good, a longing which is always there and is never appeased 
by any object in this world”.
239
  Therefore, our very being, Weil writes, “consists in 
straining towards the good. That is why we believe there is a unity between necessity and 
the good”,
240
  a unity or harmony between ‘what must necessarily be’ and ‘the sense of 
necessity’, a Pythagorean harmony which is beautiful and has value only in the domain of 
the transcendent: the Mystical. As mentioned earlier, looking at the world as beautiful is 
another way of looking at it. But now, we need to return to the ugly side of the world to 
highlight the differences between this side of necessity and the good. 
The world that is governed by blind or mechanical necessity, according to Simone 
Weil, is a world that is abandoned by God, leaving human beings to the bitterness of 
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necessity and force. She writes: “God…lets Necessity distribute [sufferings] in 
accordance with its own proper mechanism. Otherwise he would not be withdrawn from 
creation”.
241
  That is to say, necessity “represents an order without an author”.
242
  Hence, 
God’s abandonment is built into, as well revealed by, the structure of necessity, the 
mathematical structure of the world. Since everything in the world takes place solely in 
accordance with its own proper mechanism, it follows that the realm of necessity is 
independent of God.  This also explains what Weil meant by ‘God is powerless’: the 
refutation of God’s intervention in the world.
243
  In other words, the realm of necessity, 
which Weil insists upon and lays before us, indicates God’s absence (i.e., the absence of 
the good):  his withdrawal from the world, something that traditional Christianity seemed 
to ignore.  
Before we progress any further, it is worthwhile to compare Weil’s idea of the 
indifference of mathematical, mechanical necessity to whatever is the good (whatever is 
higher), to Wittgenstein’s account of logical necessity in the Tractatus. There is a clear 
affinity between them. They seem to be making a similar, if not the same, point. The 
comparison should help us to gain a better grasp of what Weil means by necessity as 
opposed to what is higher, the good or God. Wittgenstein writes: 
How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is 
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For Weil too, how things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is 
higher, God. Weil claims: “God has only been able to create by hiding himself”,
245
 by 
withdrawing from the world.  
But, Weil’s view of necessity still appears to be problematic — or rather, 
inconsistent.  On the one hand, she seems to claim that necessity is independent of the 
will of God: necessity works in accordance with its own proper mechanism, or as she 
writes: “The will of God is not the cause of any single occurrence”.
246
  On the other hand, 
she states that “God willed necessity as a blind mechanism”.
247
 Apparently, there is a 
tension between those two claims; they are inconsistent or contradictory.  In this regard, 
Rush Rhees criticizes Simone Weil for speaking of the world in relation to the will of 
God.  He seems to find speaking of the will of God to be problematic. Plato, he argues, 
turned to myth in his dialogue in order to avoid trying to do what Simone Weil is trying to 
do here.
248
   
Rhees does not explicitly explain why it is problematic to speak of the world in 
relation to the will of God. Nonetheless, he seems to be concerned about arising apparent 
contradictions of certain kinds.  For example, the following two Weilian remarks—‘The 
will of God is not the cause of any single occurrence’ and ‘With God all things are 
possible’, contradict each other.  Certainly, Weil herself was well aware of what seems to 
have made Rhees uncomfortable.   
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In Weil’s view, however, “[w]hat is contradictory for natural reason is not so for 
supernatural reason, but the latter can only use the language of the former”.
249
  She also 
thinks that certain types of contradiction must be recognized as a fact. 
Weil writes: 
A contradiction can only become fact by a miracle. 
‘With God all things are possible’ is, in itself, a meaningless phrase; it means 
simply that ‘all things are possible’, which is a thought absolutely void of 





 Therefore, the meaning of certain facts appearing to our reason or intelligence as a 
contradiction lies in the domain of the transcendent.  This Weilian view of contradiction 
is also connected her view of mystery. Certain types of contradiction are thought to be 
part of the mysteries of the faith. The mysteries of the faith, Weil argues, “when severed 
from all reason, are no longer mysteries but absurdities”.
251
  Hence, it is absurd or 
illogical to say ‘God is powerless and yet with God all things are possible’. In other 
words, Weil calls for the recognition of a contradiction in such remarks, and argues that 
those remarks are not meaningless because they are false, but because they appear to our 
intelligence or reason as absurdities.  
Furthermore, Weil writes: “The world is necessarily such that we are able to 
conceive everything that is purest by analogy”.
252
  Hence, to understand why Weil’s 
idea of necessity can be confusing, we need to pay attention to the role of a simile, 
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or rather analogical thinking “as if” in Weil’s works.
253
  What sometimes cannot be 
expressed directly can be expressed indirectly, (See Chapter 3, Sec. 3.4. p. 82-8).  
For example, her account of necessity forces her to see afflicted people as if they 
were things. What we obtain by analogy, Weil argues, is “essentially hypotheses; 
they are not true, but they are necessary if we are to have knowledge of nature 
[including human nature]…A hypothesis is a good one if it enables us to think 
clearly”
254
 and be able to perceive (returning to her view on the correct 
philosophical method) the insoluble problems in all their insolubility.  
Weil claims that affliction or misfortune can turn its victim into a thing, 
255
 or into 
a ‘matter’ which she considered to be a ‘model’ for us.
256
  In comparing an afflicted 
person to a thing, Weil tries to points out something crucial: a logical contradiction. We 
are like natural objects and yet are different. That is also why she finds political and 
moral necessities to be analogous to physical necessity.  An example given by Weil in her 
remarkable essay on Homer’s Iliad, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force”, must clarify this 
contradiction to us in a more precise way. 
According to Weil, in the Iliad ‘force’ is “that x that turns anybody who is 
subjected to it into a thing”, while he or she is still “alive”.
257
  That is to say, “[a] man 
stands disarmed and naked with a weapon pointing at him; this person becomes a corpse 
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before anybody or anything touches him. Just a minute ago, he was thinking, acting, 
hoping”.
258
   
But we are not just mere objects, since the impersonal part of us will remain 
untouched by necessity, or a blind force.  We can also recapture this contradiction, as 
Weil has put it in one of her fragmentary proposition in (1943) in this way: The essential 
contradiction in the human condition is that [a human] is subject to force, and craves for 
justice. He [or she] is subject to necessity, and craves for the good”.
259
  This craving for 
justice and/or for the good resides in the impersonal part of human beings.—“Everything 
which is impersonal in [human beings] is sacred”
260
  and is not subject to necessity.  
However, the proposition “a human is a thing” is a logical contradiction, self-
contradictory, but in affliction is true per se. Thus, Weil’s point of the metaphor ‘a thing, 
matter, or corpse’ is meant to throw light on what she thinks to be the essential 
contradiction in human life. There is, however,  a further, and deeper, ethical and 
religious point to be brought out of Weil’s idea of that within the region of necessity 
human beings are analogous to natural objects, things. This is what we discuss in the next 
section.  
 
2.2.3 Further Remarks on Weil’s Ethics: ‘Chase That Dog Away’ 
We will refer to Wittgenstein’s view on ethics in his Lecture on Ethics so that we can 
illuminate Weil’s proclamation of necessity and her account of ethics and religion more 
clearly. In this section, I will clarify two profoundly different senses of good, (relative 
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and absolute), which is also important for our understanding of Weil’s account of moral 
necessity. In order to clarify these two senses of good, I want begin with the following 
two remarks by Simone Weil: 
There is no difference between throwing a stone to get rid of a troublesome 






When a man turns away from God [or the good] he simply gives himself up to 
the law of [moral] gravity. He then believes that he is deciding and choosing, 





The following remark by Wittgenstein illustrates Weil’s main point in the two 
quotations: 
 
If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder with all 
its details, physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will 
contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition. The murderer will 
be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance the falling of a 
stone. Certainly the reading of this description might cause us pain or rage or 






This Wittgensteinian view elucidates what Weil means by insisting that within this world, 
there is only necessity, necessity, and necessity, and why she finds the recognition of a 
necessity in all facts to be essential.   
Moreover, according to Weil, necessity is the reality of this world and is ‘the sole 
foundation of facts’, not of ethics (i.e., the good): “Just as the reality of this world is the 
sole foundations of facts, so that other reality is the sole foundation of good”.
264
  The 
other reality, as it has repeatedly been stated, is the transcendental reality. Thus, this 
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world contains nothing which we could call ethical; it must be devoid of good or justice.  
To be absolutely just and good, one must suffer injustice and evil as, for example, Christ 
and Socrates did.  And that is why Weil finds the absolute good and extreme suffering or 
affliction to be impossible.  In other words, to suffer simply means to be nothing. But, it is 
logically impossible and contradictory to say: I am nothing.  
I am nothing. Impossible! It is in this sense that extreme suffering is 





However, this feeling of impossibility, Weil says, is “the feeling of the void”,
266
  
the feeling of the absence of the good or God—“The void is God”,
267
  or the feeling of the 
essential silence: ‘My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?’(Matthew 27:46). Thus, “to be 
just, one must be naked and dead—without imagination”,
268
 without filling up the void.  
That is to say, “[w]e should set aside the beliefs which fill up voids”
269
 and wait patiently. 
But, why is Weil so concerned with imagination? Because, she writes,  
[humans] exercise their imaginations in order to stop up the holes[voids]  
through which grace might pass, and for this purpose, and at the cost of a lie, 
they make for themselves idols, that is to say, relative forms of good 





Nonetheless, this impossibility, though it is absurd, Weil remarks, is “the gate leading to 
the supernatural. All we can do is to knock on it. It is another who opens”.
271
  Patience is 
what “transmutes time into eternity”.
272
  As Heidegger also said once, we cannot bring the 
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absent god forth by thinking; at best, we can awaken a readiness to wait.
273
  This waiting, 
for Weil, is the foundation of spirituality: “Waiting patiently in expectation is the 
foundation of the spiritual life”.
274
  Earlier (p. 38), I stated that the attitude of looking 
beyond ourselves, according to Weil, is ‘the attitude which corresponds with the 
beautiful.  In this way, it is also reasonable to say that the attitude of ‘waiting patiently in 
expectation’ is the attitude which corresponds with the spiritual life. 
Moreover, the earlier quote from Wittgenstein, ‘there will simply be facts, facts, 
and facts but no ethics’, also and precisely summarizes the whole philosophical, ethical, 
and religious view of Simone Weil.  This is certainly the conclusion which Weil draws to 
show how the essence of necessity is different from that of the good.  Within the realm of 
necessity, ‘the murderer will be on exactly the same level as the falling of a stone’, or 
throwing a stone to get rid of a troublesome dog will be on exactly the same level as 
saying to a slave: ‘Chase that dog away’.  A slave or an afflicted person is equal to a 
falling stone from the point view of necessity.    
Yet, Weil (also Wittgenstein) argues, “the domain of reality extends infinitely 
beyond that of facts”.
275
  So, beyond the domain of facts, as mentioned earlier, lies 
another reality which she believes to be the sole foundation of good, the absolute or the 
supernatural good.  But it is important to call to mind and not be confused that 
[t]here are two forms of good, of the same denomination, but radically 
different from each other: one which is the opposite of evil, and one which is 
the absolute—the absolute which cannot be anything but the good. The 
absolute has no opposite. The relative is not the opposite of the 
absolute…What we want is the absolute good. What is within our reach is the 
good which is correlated to evil. We mistakenly take it for what we want, like 
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the prince who sets about making love to the maid instead of the mistress. The 
mistake is due the clothes. It is the social element which sheds the colour of 





Like Wittgenstein, Weil draws our attention to a different sense of goodness.  The 
absolute good passing into what is within our reach is subjected to necessity or moral 
gravity.
277
  Thus, we must be aware of the distinction between shadowy good and the 
good in order to have a clear view of Weil’s account of ethics and faith.  
    Weil teaches us that “[t]he word ‘Good’ has not the same meaning when used as a 
term of the correlation Good-Evil”.
278
  Used in this way, in a relative sense, as a term of 
the correlation Good-Evil, the word ‘good’, she says, “represents the means”.
279
 
Following a Wittgenstein example, “if I say this is the right road I mean that it’s the right 
road relative to a certain goal”.
280
  Thus, it is not this “good” that lies beyond the range of 
necessities or facts.  The good which completely lies outside the domain of necessity or 
facts, Weil claims, is “transcendental”
281
 or, as mentioned earlier, the absolute or the 
supernatural, and has “no properties at all, except the fact of being good”.
282
  This is, 
according to Wittgenstein too, “the ethical or absolute” sense of the word ‘Good’: “Now 
let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression “the absolutely right road.”  I 
think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, 
have to go, or be ashamed for not going”,
283
 “being ashamed of [his or her] nakedness”.
284
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 According to Weil, the different means some have of hiding themselves are means 
that fall under what is the so-called relative morality: the right road relative to a certain 
goal.  But, Weil continues, “Others seek anxiously, desperately, a road by which to 
escape from the sphere of relative moralities”
285
 and to, as Kierkegaard says, “pursue 
hiddenness”.
286
   
Furthermore, for Weil, not only does the absolute good lie outside the range of facts 
and necessities, but also “outside the range of the will”.
287
  This reality which is the sole 
foundation of the absolute good, in Wittgenstein’s words, is what is mystical and makes 
itself manifest.
288
  As Gustav Thibon has pointed out,  
[s]uch mysticism had nothing in common with those religious speculations 
divorced from any personal commitment which are all too frequently the only 
testimony of intellectuals who apply themselves to the things of God.  She 
[also Wittgenstein] actually experienced in its heart-breaking reality the 
distance between ‘knowing’ and ‘knowing with all one’s soul’, and one of the 





Both Weil and Wittgenstein have attempted to abolish the distance between the necessary 
and the good.  According to Weil, “[a]n attempt to bridge the distance between the 
necessary and the good… was the great discovery made by the Greeks”.
290
  This attempt 
is nothing but attention.  It requires that the “human creature may de-create itself”, 
291
  
and de-creation, in a certain sense, means to love or consent to necessity and affliction. It 
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also suggests a total detachment.  In this way, Weil thinks, “[a]ll suffering which does not 
detach us is wasted suffering”.
292
   
Additionally, decreation is “to make something created pass into the 
uncreated”.
293
  In a slightly different context, de-creation means, as mentioned in Chapter 
One, to liberate oneself from the dream of being a person, a willing subject, or the dream 
of the power to say ‘I’.—“I think; therefore, I am”.  Hence, ‘I’ is what we have to destroy, 
and, according to Weil, only extreme affliction can rob us of the power to say ‘I’.
294
  That 
is why Weil finds affliction (or the Cross) as a point of intersection between the necessary 
and the good.
295
  Not only does affliction create the feeling of the absence of the good, 
but it creates the feeling of the presence of the good as well, and this is what, according to 
Weil, the Cross symbolizes at the same time: a feeling of a separation and union.
296
  But, 
can the absolute good be known?   
In Weil’s view, “we don’t actually know what the good is…and nothing that we 
visualize to ourselves, nothing that we think of is the good”.
297
  Although we are unable 
to deny the reality of the good, it escapes our grasp.
298
   
Then, if the absolute good is what is hidden, or if the absolutely right road, the 
absolute good, is what is unknown, then the question, as Weil herself asks, is: “How are 
we to find it?”
299
  In other words, how are we to find the absolute good?  
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It is obvious, Weil would say, that “[w]e cannot look for it outside this world”.
300
  
It can only appear “in the form of absence”.
301
  Weil writes,  
The true road [i.e., the absolute good or value] exists. But it is open only to 
those who, recognizing themselves to be incapable of finding it, give up 
looking for it, and yet do not cease to desire it to the exclusion of everything 
else. To these it is given to feed on a good which, being situated outside this 




Can this claim “the absolute good or value exists” be verified? Weil would say: “Our 
spiritual things are of value, but only physical things have a verifiable existence. 
Therefore, the value of the former can only be verified as an illumination projected on to 
the latter”.
303
  So, the absolute or the supernatural good can be verified only as a light to 
which we are attracted. Yet, we are still caught inside the physical world.  By analogy: 
We are like flies caught inside a bottle, attracted to the light and unable to go 
towards it.   
Nevertheless, it is better to remain stuck inside the bottle throughout the 
whole of time than to turn away from the light for a single moment… [The 





Earlier, Weil taught us that ‘nothing that we visualize to ourselves is the good’. 
Logically, it seems to follow that we must not visualize the good.  The following 
argument apparently suggests this and explains why: 
[w]e are better able to seize upon the fact of Divine Providence [or say the 
good] in mathematics than in the sensible world. For I can imagine an apple-
tree in blossom placed in this valley by God as a bunch of violets placed by 
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Nonetheless, we visualize the fact of Divine Providence or the good in the sensible 
world, for unless it is expressed in the sensible world, it has no existence. This will 
be discussed further in Chapter 3 (Sec.3.4).   
To sum up, I have suggested that, for Weil, necessity, (whether it is 
beautiful or ugly and brutal) is the mathematical key to understanding the authority 
that the absolute good has over us. We are left with an earlier concern regarding 
Weil’s absurdism.  The question whether Simone Weil’s thought is a presentation 
of absurdism is important. It enables us to recapture her ethical and religious views, 
but from a different angle, a Kierkegaardian angle.  
 
2.3 Weil’s Absurdism 
Simone Weil claims that another manifestation of the reality as a necessity lies in the 
absurd and insoluble contradictions.
306
  Contradiction, as Wittgenstein reminds us, must 
be regarded, “not as a catastrophe, but as a wall indicating that we can’t go on here”.
307
 In 
other words, contradiction needs must be regarded as “the terminus of human thought”.
308
  
However, the question is: Is Weil an absurdist? 
In a sense, Weil’s thought is a presentation of a form of absurdism, but what Weil 
presents, certainly, is not absurdism in Samuel Beckett’s sense.  For Weil, the world is 
mathematical, not irrational as Beckett pictures it in Waiting for Godot. The point of this 
section is to explain that Weil’s absurdism can be better understood in Kierkegaard’s 
sense: having faith by virtue of the absurd.  
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Both Kierkegaard’s and Weil’s ethical and religious ideas intersect, specifically 
with regard to their perspectives on faith.  According to both Weil and Kierkegaard, faith 
is a paradox or contradiction: the infinite distance between moral necessity, (moral good), 
and supernatural good, between the empirical reality and the transcendental reality.  One 
of the keys by which Simone Weil unlocked her understanding of this contradiction is the 
experience of affliction.  But, the key by which Kierkegaard unlocks his understanding of 
this contradiction is the experience of extreme anxiety.   
Weil considers Christ’s faith as universal paradigm of affliction, whereas 
Kierkegaard considers Abraham’s faith as a universal paradigm of an extreme anxiety. 
Weil’s and Kierkegaard’s examinations of these two cases are to show that having faith 
by virtue of absurd or contradiction is the true sense of faith.  
As far as Kierkegaard is concerned: “[Abraham] had faith by virtue of the absurd 
for human calculation was out of question, and it certainly was absurd that God, who 




The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he meant to murder 
Isaac; the religious expression is that he meant to sacrifice Isaac—but 
precisely in this contradiction is the anxiety that can make a person 
sleepless… Abraham “is kept in a state of sleeplessness, for he is 
constantly being tested […], and at every moment there is the 
possibility of his returning penitently to the universal [or the 
ethical]…Abraham remains silent—but he cannot speak. Therein lies 
the distress and anxiety…Moreover, by speaking thus, he would have 
turned away from the paradox [contradiction].
310
    
 
                                                          
309
 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 35. Calculation is the primary principle of 
Utilitarianism, known as “a theory” in normative ethics, and Rational Choice Theory 
and/or Game Theory as well.  
310
 Ibid., p. 30, 78, 113, and 118 .  
60 
 
That is to say, by speaking, he would have turned away from faith or the absolute or God, 
and, as Weil said, mentioned earlier, ( p. 51), ‘a man turns away from God he simply 
gives himself up to the law of moral gravity’, in Kierkegaard’s sense, he simply gives 
himself up to the universal. It is only by faith, Kierkegaard claims, that “one achieves any 
resemblance to Abraham”,
311
 in Weil’s case, to Christ.    
Furthermore, like Kierkegaard, Weil criticizes the Hegelian and the Marxian 
approach, mentioned in the introduction, (p. 8):  seeking finality in the future is ‘the germ 
in Hegel, as well as in Marx’. According to Kierkegaard, Abraham, the knight of faith, 
who stands in absolute relation to the absolute good, performs a teleological suspension 
of the ethical (or the universal) when he decides to sacrifice Isaac.  From the ethical point 
of view, according to Kierkegaard, Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his own son was 
an unethical act, for willing to murder your own son, whom you love more than yourself, 
is an unethical. But Abraham acts out of his faith; he “transgressed the ethical altogether 
and had a higher [telos] outside it”,
312
  the absolute good.  It is in this Kierkegaardian 
sense that Simone Weil can be characterized as an absurdist.   
To sum up, in this chapter, I have addressed and investigated the thesis that the 
absence of a meaning, God, or the good in the world is the region of necessity by 
clarifying the difference between necessity and the good.  I have demonstrated that 
necessity can be considered as the foundation of the empirical reality, whereas the good 
can be considered as the foundation of the transcendental reality. In doing so, I found 
Wittgenstein’s conception of a logical necessity and ethics to be profoundly supportive of 
this approach.  Moreover, I have insisted on the idea that Weil’s identification of a blind 
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mechanical necessity, which forces its victims, (the afflicted people) to constantly ask 
Why?, is crucial for understanding her conception of affliction, an experience of the 
absence of a reply, the  good, or God.  Finally, I argued that Weil’s sense of absurdism 
can be well understood in Kierkegaard’s, rather than Beckett’s, sense.     
Despite all the similarities between Weil and Wittgenstein and Weil and 
Kierkegaard, what distinguishes Weil from them is her extraordinary emphasis on 
affliction— Affliction is necessity. That is to say: “The absence of good, or rather the 
feeling of its absence, is affliction”.
313
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Chapter Three: A Numinous Experience: Affliction 
 
“Affliction causes God to be absent for a time, more 
absent than a dead man, more absent that light in the 
utter darkness of a cell. A kind of horror submerges 
the whole soul.” 
(Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction, p.172)  
 
 
In the introductory chapter, I proposed to explore and to clarify two correlated theses: (1) 
that the absence of a meaning, God, or the feeling of the absence of the good in the world 
is the region of necessity, and (2) the absence of a meaning, God, or the feeling of the 
absence of the good in the world is affliction.  In the preceding chapter, I have addressed 
the first thesis by clarifying Weil’s ontology (her account of mathematical necessity) and 
ethics and religion (her account of the good), as well the essential difference between 
them.  In this chapter, I address the second thesis: the absence of a meaning, God, or the 
feeling of the absence of the good in the world is, is affliction. In other words, I 
reconsider the very same relation between necessity and the good, but from a different 
direction, affliction: the great enigma of human life.   
Therefore, it must be noted that the feeling of the absence of the good, the god’s 
absence, the withdrawal of God, the feeling of being abandoned, the presence of a blind 
necessity,  running against our limit and realizing that we are not free are all different 
ways or modes of experiencing affliction. They all show something deep about human 
reality, that we are being held captive by a pitilessly blind necessity. That is, reality is 





  In other words, affliction is “designed to arrest the will, just as an 
absurdity arrests the intelligence, or absence, non-existence, arrests love”.
315
  Thus, in 
affliction, it is the human will which has above all been held captive by a pitiless 
necessity or blind force.  
Thus, it is beyond any doubt that affliction plays a significant role in Weil’s 
writings, particularly in clarifying the relation between her ontological and 
ethical/religious views, i.e., the relation between empirical reality and the transcendental.  
Yet, recognizing ‘affliction’ as a significant term appears to be an odd statement, since, 
according to Weil, affliction has no significance and its insignificance is the very essence 
of its reality.
316
  Weil also claims that one can never know what affliction is unless one is 
constrained by experience, and yet those who have been constrained by an experience of 
affliction can say nothing about it, for affliction by nature, according to Weil, is 
“inarticulate”,
317
 inexpressible or ineffable.   
In this chapter, I address four major questions: What is affliction? Or can 
affliction be known? Can affliction be explained? Can affliction be articulated? Is there a 
possibility of expressing it?  In Sec. 3.1, I will explain Weil’s conception of affliction. I 
will mostly place my attention on a certain, extreme form of affliction which causes God 
to be absent for a time and which remains ineffable.  I will also claim that affliction can 
be known only by negation, what affliction is not. Affliction is not suffering. This will led 
me to the second question in Sec. 3.2.  Here, I elucidate why Weil stands against any form 
of explanation and consolation for affliction. Answers to the first two questions will also 
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led me to why Weil thinks affliction cannot be articulated (Sec.3.3).  The final question 
(Sec. 3.4), will allow me to put forward a Weilian suggestion for expressing what is 
apparently ineffable or inexpressible in affliction.  
 
 3.1 Inarticulate Cry of Pain 
In an essay, “Human Personality”, Simone Weil states: “When affliction is seen vaguely 
from a distance, either physical or mental, so that it can be confused with simple 
suffering”.
318
  Thus, the objective of this section is to explain what affliction is by 
clarifying what affliction is not.  It is not suffering. I will also argue that a certain form of 
affliction must be understood, in Otto’s terms, as ‘a numinous experience’, a kind of 
experience which contains a quite specific moment and which remains ineffable.
 319  
  
By suffering, Weil means something idiosyncratic and extraordinary: Malheur, a 
kind of term, she says, “without its equivalent in other languages”.
320
  But that is not what 
keeps us from understanding it. What impedes our understanding of affliction is that 
affliction by nature is inarticulate (Sec. 3.2). Yet, the term has been translated as 
affliction. What is not affliction? 
 Affliction is neither a mere suffering nor “a punishment”
321
 nor “a divine 
educational method”.
322
   It is something “specific and impossible to compare with 
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  it is a mystery. Nonetheless, we must still strive to clarify affliction by 
asking: What is it that so specific about affliction? 
Weil sees affliction as a distinct form of suffering containing both reducible and 
irreducible elements: the non-physical and the physical, the expressible and the 
inexpressible elements.  If suffering can be articulated and explained, it is its reducible 
character. If it cannot, it is its irreducible character. Hence, affliction cannot be reduced to 
mere physical suffering or, in Rhees’ terms, “brought lower”.
324
  In other words, Weil 
uses the term ‘affliction’ to denote the irreducible essence of suffering, that part of 
suffering which is inherently inarticulate and ineffable and beyond even any proper and 
defined ethical and religious characterization. It cannot be conceptualized.  It is an 
experience of a distance, a void, or the silence of God.  What I suggested earlier that 
affliction is better understood if it is thought of as a numinous experience, a kind of 
experience which contains a quite specific moment and which remains ineffable.
325
  It 
should also be noted that an experience of affliction is perfectly sui generis, and it would 
be a grave mistake to reduce it to a mere expression of social, psychological, or physical 
reality. However, there is an interesting question here: In what sense is an experience of 
affliction ineffable or inarticulate?    
Weil remarks that affliction is not a physical pain, and yet there is no affliction 
without it. Affliction which is not bound up with physical (also psychological and social) 
pain is “artificial, imaginary” and can be eliminated. In other words, without a mark of 
physical pain, our thought can turn itself away in any direction: towards imaginary good.   
A pain, on the other hand, which is merely physical, is of very little value and can leave 
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no mark on the soul, e.g., a momentary headache.
326
  Moreover, as Rhees has stated, 
“[p]eople think of human suffering as a mistake… [, and think] [w]ith the progress of 
medicine (and of genetics and other sciences) suffering can practically be stamped 
out”.
327
  Obviously, this view is based on the misunderstandings of suffering and 
affliction, reducing affliction to a mere physical pain. But, by human suffering, Weil 
means human affliction.  This explains why she preferred to use the term affliction and 
distinguished it from a mere physical pain or suffering.    
Therefore, affliction, though inseparable from a physical pain or suffering, is 
essentially different— essentially idiosyncratic and irreducible. The irreducible element 
of suffering is bound up with a religious and ethical question concerning the, use, 
purpose, significance of suffering—or rather, with the ultimate meaning of life. But, 
following Wittgenstein, it must be admitted that: “Ethics [and religion] so far as it springs 
from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, 
the absolute valuable, can be no science”.
328
  It seems to be reasonable to say, then, that 
“even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life 
remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this itself is 
the answer”.
329
  Thus, “[w]hat we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”.
330
  
The reducible parts of suffering might well be explained in terms of casual 
explanation. Let us recall Weil’s earlier remark: “Things have causes and not ends".
331
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For example, human crime is the cause of most affliction.
332
  On the other hand, the 
irreducible part of suffering is connected with the meaning of suffering which lies outside 
the region of necessity or the world. Accordingly, it will remain, Weil might say, as a 
religious mystery. This mystery or rather “[t]he mysteries of the faith cannot be either 
affirmed or denied”,
333
  because they do not address themselves to intelligence, but to 
love.
334
  Love means consent, to consent to necessity. In other words, love, as mentioned 
earlier (p. 39), means the recognition and acceptance of necessity regardless of whether it 
is beautiful or brutal and ugly.  
What will remain as mystery in affliction is the meaning standing behind it. In 
other words, the presence of the meaning of affliction showing itself in the form of 
absence is what is mysterious about affliction. Let us restate the main thesis of this 
chapter: Affliction is an experience of a harsh, blind necessity. In certain extreme cases, 
affliction is a numinous experience of the absence of a meaning, or a telos, or God, or the 
feeling of the absence of the good in the world.  This still needs to be clarified further in 
order to be able to grasp what Weil means by affliction.   
Above all, Weil characterizes affliction as “an uprooting of life”.
335
  In other 
words, “[t]here is no real affliction unless the event which has gripped and uprooted a life 
attacks it, directly or indirectly, in all its parts, social, psychological, and physical. The 
social factor is essential”.
336
  Why is the social factor so essential? Weil’s answer in The 
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Need for Roots is: “To be rooted [in a tradition] is perhaps the most important and least 
recognized need of the human soul”.
337
  
In Weil’s view, affliction, as an experience of a blind necessity, “deprives its 
victims of their personality and turns them into things. It is indifferent”.
338
  That is to say, 
“a blind mechanism… produces indiscriminately and impartially just or unjust results”.
339
  
Hence, the inexorable necessity or force is completely indifferent to just (and innocent) 
and unjust (and guilty) people equally. For example, Weil writes, affliction constrained a 
just man, Christ (also Job), ‘to cry out against God’ and ‘to seek consolation from man 
and ‘to believe he was forsaken by the Father’.
340
  It must be said, as Cayley has 
observed, “[t]he degrading character of Christ’s crucifixion is often obscured by the 
glorious significance Christians attach to this event, but, for Weil, degradation was its 
essence. Taken out of the city, abandoned by his followers, hung on a cross, he believed, 
according to two gospels, that even God had forsaken him. He was absolutely alone”
341
 
and was ruthlessly uprooted from life.    
According to Weil, the key point is that affliction, as much as necessity, invites 
the insoluble question: Why?  In other words, ‘affliction produces the absence of God, 
and yet, it constrains a person to cry out or ask continually ‘Why?’,
342
 “inwardly crying 
‘Make it stop, I can bear no more’”,
343
 ‘Why am I being hurt?’
344
  What we cry out for is 
an explanation, or rather and more precisely, the meaning or purpose of suffering.  Is 
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there any purpose to suffering? To that question, Weil stated, there is essentially no 
reply.
345
 Why there is suffering never has any answer, as the world is devoid of finality.  
In other words, the absence of finality, purpose, meaning, the good, or God, is the region 
of necessity. Thus, to ask ‘Why am I being hurt? is, by analogy, the same as to ask: ‘Why 
these things rather than others?’ The only legitimate response to such a question is it is 
reality.—Reality is necessity. The feeling of our wretchedness is the feeling of reality and 
it is truly real, not something that we create.
346
   
Certainly, Weil writes:  “We have to say like Ivan Karamazov that nothing can 
make up for a single tear from a single child, and yet to accept all tears and the nameless 
horrors which are beyond tears… We have to accept the fact that they exist simply 
because they do exist”.
347
  Hence, to fail to recognize that reality is necessity is to accept 




If God lets necessity make everything subject to its pitilessness and impartiality, 
and if necessity is affliction, then, as Grant asks, “Is necessity to be charged to God?... a 
charge against God when [necessity] appears to us as affliction”.
349
  According to Weil, 
“we should accuse God for every human affliction. Just as God replies with silence, so we 
should reply with silence”.
350
 That is, “[t]he silence of God compels us to an inward 
silence”.
351
  For Weil, as for nearly all mystics, this is a unique feeling-response, and the 
way to touch the silence of God can be pursued only by means of ‘inward silence’. Weil 
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writes, “when we cry out for an answer and it is not given to us—it is then that we touch 
the silence of God”
352
 or the absence of a meaning or the good, or the void.  Following 
Otto, I have called this: numinous experience which Otto characterized as an ineffable 
experience of the ‘holy’, in Weil’s cases, an ineffable experience of God’s absence, the 
essential silence.      
To conclude, I began this section by clarifying what affliction is not in order to 
mark out Weil’s account of affliction. Affliction, for example, is not a mere physical 
suffering or punishment. Indeed, as argued, suffering contains two parts: the reducible, 
the psychological, social, and physical part, and the irreducible, the transcendental, 
mysterious meaning of part. Drawing on Otto’s account of a numinous experience’, I 
have argued that a certain type of affliction could be well understood as a numinous 
experience, a kind of momentary experience of the absence of God or good. This 
characterization of affliction also suggests that not everyone experiences affliction though 
everyone may experience some form of suffering in life.  For Weil, the paradigm of 
affliction resonates in Christ’s crucifixion.  
  However, when an afflicted person cries out, “Why am I being hurt?”, he or she  
seeks, not only a physical, but primarily an intellectual or theoretical consolation. In other 
words, the afflicted person is yearning for an answer or an explanation.  The question is 
whether one should seek consolation. Grappling with this issue, seeking an intellectual 
consolation, is the core aim of the following section. Also, we need to know whether Weil 
regards ‘consolation’ as a form of explanation. 
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3.2 Contemplation or Explanation 
In this section, I elucidate why Weil stands against any form of natural explanation and/or 
consolation as a solution to affliction.  What does affliction ask for? This will help Weil’s 
response to this question.   
As stated in the introduction (p. 11), Simone Weil strongly rejects consolation. 
She writes that the afflicted person must not weep so as not to be comforted.  Surely, we 
must wonder why.  The reason is, according to Weil, because consolation is a hindrance 
to true faith.  This also explains why she thought that insofar as religion is ‘a source of 
consolation, it is a hindrance to true faith’.  Then, it is rational to say that affliction can 
take the afflicted person’s attention away from truth (whatever truth might be).  Let us 
recall Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: Human beings are chained down in the cave so that 
they cannot move and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from 
turning round their heads.  That is to say, people in affliction are often prevented from 
looking in a different direction, to accept, consent, or love and contemplate on their 
affliction. But, we must also realize that to help them to look in a different direction is a 
difficult undertaking, since, as Wittgenstein would say, they resist our attempts to turn 
them away from where they think the right direction must be.
353
  And that is why Simone 
Weil believes that what affliction demands can be counted, not upon ordinary people, but 
only upon those of the very highest genius, such as Aeschylus and Homer, the poet of the 
Iliad.
354
     
However, the right direction or solution is contemplation rather than consolation. 
She writes:  “We have got to contemplate…affliction in all its bitterness and without 
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  In this regard, George Grant claimed once: “Philosophy is the… critical 
form of the contemplative life. Thus, it is inseparable from faith”.
356
  Earlier we asked 
whether Weil regards ‘consolation’ as a form of explanation, too.     
Weil states: “to explain suffering is to console it. Therefore it must not be 
explained”.
357
  Given what has been argued thus far, it follows that the role of intelligence 
is not to seek consolation or explanation, but contemplation. Contemplation is analogous 
to “the aesthetic criterion”.
358
  In aesthetics, for example, “[t]he poem teaches us to 
contemplate thoughts instead of changing it”.
359
  Moreover, the contemplation of an 
afflicted person, according to Weil, is “supernatural compassion”,
360
 and supernatural 
compassion “implies acceptance, since one voluntarily causes one’s own being to descend 
into some unhappy being”.
361
  We can also say, supernatural compassion implies love, 
since to accept a person in affliction means to love the person in affliction. That is ‘one 
voluntarily causes one’s own being to descend into some unhappy being’, the afflicted 
person.  Furthermore, it has repeatedly claimed that affliction is necessity, and necessity 
is everything that is not God.  Hence, to love some unhappy being is to love necessity by 
negation, necessity is not God—recall: God is not the cause of my suffering and He is 
powerless. We called this attempt a negative love (p. 38-9): All that I conceive of as true 
is less true than those things of which I cannot conceive the truth, but which I love. It can 
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also be characterized as an indirect attempt to grasp what cannot be explained (Ch. 3. Sec. 
3.2.1).  This is also connected with Weil’s ‘negative approach’, in her own terms, 
negative faith: ‘To believe that we can grasp only what lies within the domain of 
necessity’ (see the Conclusion).  
  Therefore, consolation (and/or explanation) in affliction “draws us away from 
love and truth”. 
362
  It draws us away from the silence of God.   It prevents us from 
acknowledging and accepting “the existence of affliction by considering it as a 
distance”,
363
  a distance between necessity and God or the good.  To accept the existence 
of affliction is to acknowledge that we are nothing, but a point in this distance.  That is 
why “we must never seek consolation [or explanation or justification] for pain”.
364
  Weil 
seems to view explanation as a sin. That is to say, what one may experience in affliction 
is a void (one can hear no answer but silence). An explanation is an attempt to escape 
from suffering by filling such a void. It is an attempt to give an answer to which there is 
no answer, and this is what we mean by an explanation is sin. — “What makes man 
capable of sin is the void; all sins are attempts to fill voids”.
365
  Moreover, an explanation 
is a way of resisting to accept ‘the no-reply’ answer to affliction. This should also lead us 
to understand why Weil finds even religious or spiritual consolation to be apparently a 
hindrance to truth.  Hence, Weil would argue, we must only “seek for knowledge in 
suffering”
366
  by means of contemplation and attention.   
Finally, the attempt to explain suffering, Weil would say, is certainly wrong, and, 
like Wittgenstein, she would say: “the explanation isn’t what satisfies us here at 
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all...explanation [for example] will be of little help to someone, say, who is upset because 
of love.—It will not calm him”.
367
  Therefore, no explanation can make up for a single 
tear from a child and no explanation will satisfy or calm us.  Here, following 
Wittgenstein, “one must only correctly piece together what one knows, without adding 
anything…one can only describe and say: this is what human life is like”.
368
 As Weil 
mentions in a letter to Gustave Thibon, the perfect description would be “to write as we 
translate.  When we translate a text written in a foreign language, we do not seek to add 
anything to it”.
369
  Perhaps J. M. Perrin is right in noting that Simone Weil “does not 
provide us with a solution but a question: not a reply, but an appeal; not a conclusion, but 
a need”, 
370
 the need for the good.  According to Weil, “[t]he absolute good lies wholly in 
this need. But we are unable to go and lay hold of it therein”.
371
 All we are able to do is to 
go on wanting to love the good.  Thus, the only choice given to us is to desire it or not to 
desire it. Even if we are able to desire it, we will still not be freed from the bitterness of 
mechanical or blind necessity. But, Weil states, a “new necessity is added to it, a 
necessity constituted by the laws pertaining to supernatural things”.
372
 This new necessity 
is what she calls: a spiritual necessity.     
To sum up, first, we should allow ourselves to recall that in certain cases, 
affliction turns its victims into a thing while they are still alive and causes God to be 
absent. During this absence, what an afflicted person yearns for is consolation and 
explanation.  This solution is what Weil rejects, as I have explained in this section. She 
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offers us contemplation and love as an accurate solution. To seek consolation and 
explanation for pain or suffering is to escape from truth and love. True knowledge, 
according to Weil, lie in affliction. We must seek knowledge in suffering.   
However, we might still be puzzled by another interesting Weilian idea of the 
inarticulateness of affliction. Should we then not speak about affliction? This should be 
the primary concern of the upcoming section. 
 
3.3 Can Affliction Be Articulated?  
In the preceding section, I have characterized affliction as ‘a numinous experience’, an 
experience which contains a quite specific moment, God’s absence, and which also 
remains ineffable. Clarifying this idea is the primarily concern of this section. According 
to Simone Weil, affliction cannot be articulated, for affliction by nature is inarticulate or 
ineffable. The question is in what sense affliction is ineffable. Admittedly, the ineffability 
of affliction should enable us to realize and understand how affliction is different from 
suffering and why it also cannot be reduced to a mere physical, psychological, or social 
suffering.  I will begin this section by examining Grant’s answer to this question.  
George Grant states: “[Simone Weil] does not say affliction is ineffable in the 
sense that the immediate apprehension of God is, but it is very difficult to describe, and 
indescribable to anyone who has had no contact with it”,
373
  This is not only a misleading 
interpretation of what Weil means by affliction, and why affliction cannot be articulated, 
but it is also an erroneous one.  Here, Grant fails to see the distinction between suffering 
and affliction.  Ostensibly, Grant is accurate about one point; Weil does confirm that 
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“those who have never had contact with affliction in its true sense can have no idea what 
it is, even though they might have known much suffering”.
374
  At the same time, however, 
Grant appears to be ignoring the fact that, for Weil, an experience of affliction is an 
immediate apprehension of God in the form of an absence; it is an experience of hearing 
the silence of God.   In affliction, Weil remarks, we touch the silence or absence of God 
when we learn to hear and understand the language of silence.
375
 What can be learned 
from silence? Certainly, Weil would say, all we can learn is inward silence.— “Just as 
God replies with silence, so we should reply with silence”.
376
 However, Weil’s 
proclamation of God’s absence, by analogy, more absent than a dead person, is an 
immediate apprehension of God in the form of being dead or absent.  This is the only 
genuine moment where one can apprehend a true God, God as absent or as the hidden 
God.  In all other cases, Weil might say, what we comprehend as God is not God, for to 
conceive a visualized or an imagined God as God, for Weil, is wrong. In this way, one of 
the purposes of imagination is to fill the void, God’s absence.
377
  This also shows the 
importance, peculiarity, and depth of Weil’s philosophical and theological notion of 
affliction in relation to God.  In brief, one makes a grave mistake, as Grant does, if one 
separates contact with affliction from contact with God.  In other words, for Weil, 
affliction is not ineffable in the sense for which as Grant has argued. Furthermore, to 
comprehend the ineffability claim of affliction, we need to understand how Simone Weil 
has viewed language in relation to what is ineffable, God’s absence, or the absolute good.    
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Like Wittgenstein, she draws our attention to the limits of language. Language can 
express only what is within the world. What appears to us, at least in some cases, in 
affliction is hidden, or absent, or lies beyond the limit of language. We can also say that 
language can express only what can be imagined or visualized. But, for Weil, God cannot 
be imagined or visualized; therefore, God cannot be expressed or articulated. Let us 
address and develop this line of thought below and further in the next Section (3.2.1). 
Simone Weil states that a mind enclosed in language is imprisoned and can 
possess only opinions; it is language, Weil asserts, that always formulates opinions.378    
And Weil remarks that those who are unaware of being held captive live in error and 
might prefer to blind themselves to the fact.  On the other hand, those who are aware of 
being held captive by language and yet hate to live in error will have to suffer 
tremendously.
379
  Then, Weil states that “it is the same barrier [i.e., language] which 
keeps us from understanding affliction”.
380
  
Furthermore, in affliction, we experience captivity in a brutal sense and seek 
freedom but are subject to a blind necessity. So, one who is subject to it “quivers like a 
butterfly pinned alive to a tray”
381
 or “like flies [a fly] caught inside a bottle, attracted to 
the light and unable to go towards it. What Weil draws to our attention is a contradiction 
which our mind tries to overcome yet is unable to. The essential contradiction is this: we 
are subject to a blind mechanical necessity and/or force; yet, we yearn for the good and 
justice.  Hence, affliction, as a numinous experience, reveals this contradiction or 
paradox. Weil writes: 
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 A contradiction can only become fact by a miracle. 
‘With God all things are possible’ is, in itself, a meaningless phrase; it 
means simply that ‘all things are possible’, which is a thought 
absolutely void of content. The real meaning is: in the domain of the 




In other words, “What is contradictory [or paradoxical] for natural reason is not so for 
supernatural reason, but the latter can only use the language of the former”.
383
 What does 
this mean? Here Wittgenstein helps too. He writes: It is a paradox that an experience, e.g., 
the experience of seeing the world as a miracle should seem to have supernatural value or 
meaning.
384
  To say the latter can only use natural language is to say that  once we use 
natural language to express what is higher, supernatural, or what lies beyond the world, it 
appears as a paradox because, as Wittgenstein remarks, “Our words used as we use them 
in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying…natural meaning and 
sense”.
385
 Thus, whatever lies beyond the limits of language contradicts itself as soon as it 
is to be placed in (and expressed by) natural language. In this way, it continues to lack 
cohesion and remains in contradiction with itself. There is a further argument, which is 
still related to language, to be addressed below.  
Weil claims that the thought of affliction is not of “a discursive kind”;
386
  it 
cannot be known through reason, because affliction, according Weil, is contradiction 
and, therefore, can only be felt as being something impossible.
387
 She writes: “Human 
life is impossible [or contradictory]. But affliction alone causes this to be felt”.
388
  In 
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other words, in affliction, we experience reality as necessity and realize that we are 
chained down by necessity as mere material things, yet, we seek freedom—that is, we 
try to overcome the contradiction. But this cannot be known by reason; it can only be 
felt.  More precisely, this feeling is the feeling, in Rudolf Otto’s terms, which remains 
where the concept [or language] fails.
389
 According to Weil, this feeling, which is 
irreducible, is religious. It is the feeling of the void, God’s absence, or the feeling of 
distance. “To feel this distance means a spiritual quartering, it means fructification”.
390
   
But then, how could what appears to us in affliction be conceived or apprehended?  
Weil replies: “Since the highest is beyond the reach of thought, in order to conceive it we 
must conceive it through that which is within the scope of thought”.
391
  To clarify further, 
the following remark on the notion of ‘mystery’ will be of great help. Weil writes: 
 
The notion of mystery is legitimate when the most logical and most rigorous 
use of the intelligence leads to an impasse, to a contradiction which is 
inescapable in this sense: that the suppression of one term makes the other 
term meaningless…Then, like a lever, the notion of mystery carries thought 
beyond the impasse, to the other side of the unopenable door, beyond the 
domain of the intelligence and above it. But to arrive beyond the domain of 
the intelligence one must have travelled all through it, to the end, and by a 
path traced with unimpeachable rigour. Otherwise, one is not beyond it but on 





By the notion of ‘mystery’ or the metaphor of ‘a lever’, Weil means attention: “The 
lever…is the attention or prayer”.
393
  Hence, it is attention that enables one to go beyond 
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the impasse, the contradiction, or the domain of the intelligence, and that is why Weil 
considers attention to be a mysterious, religious notion.   
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, and 
ready to be penetrated by the object…above all our thought should be empty, 
waiting, not seeking anything, but to be ready to receive in its naked truth the 




The object—whatever the object it might be, must be received through necessity. In other 
words, “Good that is impossible”
395
 must be conceived through possibility—“We have to 
accomplish the possible in order to… be able to grasp the absurdity and impossibility of 
pure good”.
396
   
Moreover, affliction, as the experience of the absurdity and impossibility of pure 
good “brings about the transmutation of the will to love”.
397
   That is to say, affliction 
comes upon us, as mentioned earlier, ‘against our will’ and can turn the will into love. 
Surely, the willing-subject resists this transmutation. Thus, as Wittgenstein reminded us 
(p. 26), what has to be overcome is a difficulty of the will, the willing subject who resists 
to consent to necessity and affliction. 
Moreover, love is presupposed by attention.  Attention or rather, “[a] bsolutely 
unmixed attention…is the same thing as prayer. It presupposes faith and love”.
398
  It cures 
our faults.  Thus, we should be able to “cure our faults by attention and not by will”.
399
 
Attention is “bound up with…consent”,
400
 or love.  Love as well as attention, “teaches 
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one to believe in an external reality… [, and] places the center outside oneself”.
401
  It 
teaches one to believe in the transcendental reality.  
According to Weil, “[t]here is no entry into the transcendent until the human 
faculties—intelligence, will, human love—have come up against a limit”.
402
 Affliction is 
an experience of this limit. Affliction teaches us that “there is a limit, and that one will 
not pass beyond it without supernatural aid”,
403
  or supernatural love. Furthermore, 
according to Weil, when we run up against the limit, we are left with only one choice: 
either to consent to it or not. For Weil, we must consent to it, and yet "[s]uch consent is 
love. The face of this love, which is turned toward a thinking person, is the love of our 
neighbor; the face turned toward matter is love of the order of the world [or love of 
necessity], or love of the beauty of the world which is the same thing".
404
  Weil considers 
the root of love to be humility.
405
  She writes: “Humility consists in the knowledge that 
one is nothing in so far as one is a human being”.
406
  Regardless of whether love is 
orientated towards a thinking person or the good, or God, Weil mentions that “it is only 
necessary to know that love is an orientation and not a state of the soul”.
407
   
To consent or to love is not without any difficulty.  The most difficult thing is to 
go on loving in the void during affliction, an experience of God’s absence. Simone Weil 
writes: 
During this absence [God’s absence] there is nothing to love. What is terrible 
is that if, in this darkness where there is nothing to love, the soul ceases to 
love, God’s absence becomes final. The soul has to go on loving in the void, 
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or at least to go on wanting to love…Then one day, God will come to show 
himself to this soul and to reveal the beauty of the world to it, as in the case of 
Job. But if the soul stops to loving it falls, even in this life, into something 




In summary, I have spelled out Weil’s proclamation of the ineffability of affliction   
by beginning with repudiating Grant’s interpretation of the proclamation. Grant argues 
affliction is not ineffable in the sense as an immediate comprehension of God is. I have 
demonstrated that Weil’s conception of affliction, as a numinous experience of God’s 
absence, does not allow for such a distinction, at least in some cases, e.g., the story of Job, 
or  Chris’s crucifixion.  In short, Grant is misguided in his separation of contact with 
affliction from contact with God.  I have also suggested that through Weil’s view of 
language, we can have a better way of understanding why Weil thought affliction cannot 
be articulated.  The idea that language is limited was offered as Weil’s essential 
arguments for the inarticulateness nature of affliction. I have also argued that, for Weil, 
affliction cannot be known through reason, but feeling, the feeling, as Otto teaches us, 
which remains where reason, concept, or language, fails. But does that mean we should 
then not dare to speak about affliction?  The following last section will provide Weil’s 
response to this question.  
 
3.4 Weil’s Response  
In the preceding section, I have elucidated Weil’s claim that affliction, as a numinous 
experience of what is hidden and esoteric, cannot be articulated.  This claim apparently 
suggests that we should not speak about affliction.  Although this seems to be a 
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reasonable suggestion, this is not what one needs to infer from such a claim. The 
question, then, is: “What would Simone Weil suggest as a possible response to thoughts 
which are inexpressible?” Responding to this question is the primary point of this section 
and will bring us to the end of this study.   
In respond to whether we should not dare to speak about affliction, Weil suggests 
that there is a possibility of indirect expression to communicate with what is hidden from 
us, the absolute good or God.  She writes:  
The link which attaches the human being to the reality outside the world 
is, like the reality itself, beyond the reach of human faculties. The 
respect that it inspires us as soon as it is recognized cannot be expressed 
to it. This respect cannot, in this world, find any form of direct 
expression. But unless it is expressed it has no existence. There is a 




There is another reality outside the world of necessity which Weil calls ‘transcendental 
reality’, the reality of the good or God as hidden and esoteric. The hiddenness is the 
essence of this reality and can only be experienced and felt in affliction.  Weil writes: 
“Corresponding to this reality, at the centre of the human heart, is the longing for an 
absolute good, a longing which is always there and is never appeased by any object in this 
world”.
410
  Even though the transcendental reality is beyond the reach of human faculties, 
Weill claims, the human being has the power of turning their “attention and love” towards 
it, and the only condition for exercising this power is “consent”,
411
 to consent to necessity 
or to accepting reality as necessity. Thus, the link which attaches the human being to the 
reality outside the world is attention and love, and the sole condition for exercising love 
and attention is consent. Thus, the religious and ethical aspects of love and attention, Weil 
                                                          
409
 Weil, “Draft for a Statement of Human Obligation”, p. 221. 
410
 Ibid., p. 219. 
411
 Ibid., p. 219. 
84 
 
asserts, is like ‘the lever’ (see p. 79):  It can carry thought beyond the impasse of 
propositional or factual language and the domain of the necessity, to the other side of the 
world, the transcendental world.  
What is most important is Weil’s insistence that the notion of the absolute good or 
God, which (and who) lies beyond the sphere of necessity and the boundaries of 
language, can only be commutated by means of indirect expression. Along these lines, 
religious and ethical terms
412
 must be considered as means of indirect expressions of the 
longing for the absolute good or God.  Certainly, religious and ethical terms, as 
Wittgenstein states, can be regarded as similes: 
all religious terms seem…to be used as similes or allegorically. For 
when we speak of God and that he sees everything and when we kneel 
to pray to Him all our terms and actions seem to be parts of a great and 
elaborate allegory which represents Him as a human being of great 
power whose grace we try to win…Thus in ethical and religious 





So, it must be rigorous to suggest that we resort to similes in order to express thoughts 
which are inexpressible or ineffable, or to carry us beyond the impasse direct expressions 
and the domain of the necessity.  But, should we include from this suggestion that, e.g., 
religious similes enable us to understand clearly what cannot be understood by means of 
direct expressions?  
First, we need to recall (p. 56): nothing that we visualize to ourselves is the good 
or God.  That is, the longing for an absolute good is never appeased by any object in this 
world.  Yet, unless it is visualized or expressed it has no existence.  For example, 
representing God that we visualize to ourselves as a human being is not God.  Yet, unless 
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God is visualized or expressed metaphorically, e.g., as a human being, God has no 
existence. But, this does not necessary mean that a simile or a metaphor gives us a clearer 
view of what is beyond the reach of human faculties. In fact, any form of indirect 
expression can be regarded as a hallmark of the limits of human understanding.  Should 
we, then, not call this attempt: a hopeless attempt?  Weil states: 
A man whose mind feels that it is captive would prefer to blind himself to the 
fact.  But if he hates falsehood, he will not do so; and in that case he has to 
suffer a lot. He will beat his head against the wall until he faints. He will 
come to again and look with terror at the wall, until one day he begins afresh 






This suggests that although it might be hopeless, we must keep trying to communicate 
with what lies beyond the reach of human understanding.  Like Wittgenstein, one can say: 
 
My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all [humans] who ever 
tried…to write or talk Ethics and Religion was to run against the boundaries 






This running against the walls of our cage, the boundaries of language, is 
absolutely hopeless and absurd. It is also hopeless because, as Weil might say, nothing 
that we visualize to ourselves represents what is hidden.  We exercise our imaginations in 
order to stop up the impossibility of representing of what is hidden or absent although it 
still escapes our attempt to be grasped, imagined, or visualized.  Thus, we should also 
allow ourselves to recall an earlier remark ,(p. 57) the absolute good  is ‘open only to 
those who, recognizing themselves to be incapable of finding it, give up looking for it, 
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and yet do not cease to desire it to the exclusion of everything else’. This is not an 
expression of any form of skepticism. In contrast, according to Weil, the absolute good is 
open only to those who ‘live the truth of certainty through faith’ (p. 6).   
Moreover, I argue that certain forms of indirect expressions, in Jan Zwicky’s 
terms, ‘serious ineffability claims’, must be considered as an expression of this desire or 
longing.  Zwicky writes: 
By ‘serious ineffability claims’ I mean ones in which people really appear to 
be driving at something—they’re not just being flip, or witty, or feeling 
frustrated by the complexity of some situation. What would have to be the 
case for such ineffability claims to be true? The question is difficult because 
we are immediately confronted by an empirical puzzle that cannot be easily 
dismissed: often, we make a serious ineffability claim but then don’t fall 
silent. We keep trying to communicate, or articulately wishing that we could. 
The desire to communicate is still manifestly present. The ineffability claim 
itself can be an expression of this desire.
416
   
 
 
Concisely, an indirect expression is the expression of the longing for an absolute good or 
God.  We keep trying to communicate with what can only be commutated by means of 
indirect expressions endlessly and without hope.  Such an attempt, however, Weil claims 
requires such a mind that has reached the point where it already dwells in truth: 
The mind which has learned to grasp thoughts which are inexpressible 
because of the number of relations they combine, although they are more 
rigorous and clearer than anything that can be expressed in the most precise 
language, such a mind has reached the point where it already dwells in truth. 






In addition, as K. Wright-Bushman has pointed out, “[b]oth the religious aspect of 
attention and Weil’s ethics connect clearly to her understanding of how the poet 
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  It follows that poetry, or rather aesthetical expressions, must be 
considered as another possibility for expressing thought that are inexpressible.  For 
example, poetry, Weil remarks, means “passing through words into silence”.
419
 This 
bear a resemblance to what was mentioned earlier: to arrive beyond the domain of 
the intelligence, i.e., arriving at silence, one must have travelled all through it.  For 
Weil, poetry and music are important because, as she writes, poetry teaches us “to 
contemplate thoughts instead of changing them”.
420
   
Undoubtedly, Weil is not alone in providing poetic expressions as a 
possibility of indirect expression of ineffability.  Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and 
Heidegger (also others) have also put forward a similar suggestion.  For example, 
Heidegger, whose suggestion comes so close to that of Weil, writes: 
The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and poetizing we 
prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god or for the absence of a 
god…At best we can awaken a readiness to wait.
421
   
 
Waiting in expectation, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, (p. 52-3), is the foundation 
of the spiritual life. Then, “one day, God will come to show himself to this soul and to 
reveal the beauty of the world to it, as in the case of Job”.
422
 Certainly, as Wittgenstein 
remarked once: “‘You can’t hear God speak to someone else, you can hear him only if 
you are being addressed’.—This is a grammatical remark”,
423
 not an empirical remark.   
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Finally, in order to clarify the thesis that the absence of a meaning, God, or the 
feeling of the absence of the good in the world is affliction, I have identified a certain 
type of affliction as a numinous experience of God’s absence and argued such an 
experience cannot be known through reasoning, but feeling.  I have also argued that 
affliction different from a mere physical suffering cannot be either explained or 
articulated, for affliction is intrinsically inarticulate. Nonetheless, I have proposed 
religious, ethical, and aesthetical expressions as possibilities of expressing thoughts which 



















Chapter Four: Conclusion: ‘The Back Side of Necessity’  
 
My purposes in this chapter are:  to restate the primary thesis with which this study is 
concerned, to point out the difficulties I found to be crucial, to give a summary of the two 
main chapters (2 and 3), and finally, to propose a potential concern for further study.  
This study examined Simone Weil’s philosophical, ethical, and religious 
conceptions of affliction and necessity. I have argued that affliction and necessity are 
inseparable. In other words, I argued that neither can be grasped fully without the other, 
and together, they illuminate what Weil means by affliction, a concept without which 
understanding her later philosophical, political, ethical, and religious thought would be 
impossible. 
I presented affliction and beauty as two different aspects of necessity.  However, I 
have, primarily, placed my attention on the afflicted side of necessity. According to Weil, 
affliction, not a mere physical, psychological, or social suffering, is the great enigma of 
human life. It is the hallmark of the indispensable contradiction or paradox in the human 
life: An afflicted person is subject to a blindly brutal necessity and, yet, yearning for the 
good or justice which lies beyond the region of necessity, and which can only be known 
by negation—what is not good.   In Weil’s view, faith, or rather negative faith, as I have 
argued, is nothing, but this contradiction or paradox.  
More precisely, this study constructed, clarified, and examined Weil’s twofold 
thesis: (1) that the absence of a meaning, or God, or the feeling of the absence of the good 
in the world is the region of necessity, and (2), that the absence of a meaning, or God, or 
the feeling of the absence of the good in the world is affliction. The questions by which 
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the twofold thesis was approached are: What is necessity? What is affliction? What is this 
absence of the meaning, or the good, or God?  Responses to each of the above questions 
were meant to serve as elucidations of those two correlated theses. 
 I first addressed a difficulty I found to be most critical: proposing a single 
coherent unity. The Notebooks of Simone Weil, on which this study is largely dependent, 
present no system of ideas and possess no clear unity. Therefore, misconnections, 
confusions, misunderstandings, and misinterpretations were virtually impossible to be 
avoided.  As a result of a two years tireless attempt with the help of Wittgenstein (also 
Kierkegaard), I was able to trace out the connections between those remarkable notes and 
overcome this difficulty.  The question and degree of success was left out for my thesis 
committee and the reader. In the first chapter, I have also addressed some important 
aspects of Weil’s life and thought, mainly, though those scholars who are well aware of 
the importance of Simone Weil, a remarkably brilliant, a genius spirit, and mad. Through 
my reading of the secondary sources, I have pointed out to another difficulty, the 
difficulty of classifying Weil’s thought. As I have briefly stated, although Simone Weil 
remains unclassifiable, she has been classified and labeled in many different ways. Those 
labels, often contradicting one another, shows the controversiality of Weil’s thought.  In 
this regard, I have argued that Weil is a kind of a theologian and philosopher, who is not a 
member of any community of ideas. 
Chapter 2 examined the thesis (1) that the absence of a meaning, or God, or the 
feeling of the absence of the good in the world is the region of necessity.  In the first 
section, I have laid out Weil’s conceptual, ontological investigation of the world by 
investigating her conception of necessity. The world is necessity. That is, everything in 
the world is governed by a mechanical necessity or a blind force. Thus, reality is the sole 
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necessity showing itself, primarily, in two different forms: suffering or affliction and 
beauty.  It was argued that there is no answer to the question ‘why these things rather than 
others?’ The only answer to the question, ‘why are things beautiful or ugly and brutal 
(e.g., affliction)’ is: necessity. That is, reality is necessity.  The difficulty is that such an 
answer, at least in some cases, does not appear to be satisfactory. The answer does not 
satisfy the questioner, for what the questioner cries out for is a metaphysical, ethical, or 
religious explanation, meaning, or purpose. In other words, this difficulty of stopping 
oneself from asking the why-question is a metaphysical, ethical, and religious difficulty.  
Moreover, I have argued that, for Weil, the recognition of necessity in all facts, 
including human facts, regardless of kinds, whether a mathematical necessity or 
something analogous, is what is crucial.  The key point about Weil insistence on the 
recognition of necessity is to disclose that which lies outside its range, the good or God.  
In other words, Weil investigates the question of the good or God by investigating what 
necessity is, or what the good or God is not. Thus, it is in this sense that Weil’s religious 
method should be described as a negative.  Negative faith: To believe that we can grasp 
only what lies within the domain of necessity; to believe that what we cannot grasp or lies 
beyond our grasp is hidden and yet more real; finally, to believe that what we grasp from 
our own perspective is deceptive.
424
  
I have also argued that Weil’s ontological account of necessity—reality is 
necessity and lacks meaning, is a presentation of a form of absurdism, but in 
Kierkegaard’s sense: having faith by virtue of the absurd or contradiction.  
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Chapter 3, reconsidered the same very points were made in the preceding chapter 
by examining the thesis (2) that the absence of a meaning, or God, or the feeling of the 
absence of the good in the world is affliction—affliction is necessity. 
I have argued that affliction, as a distinct form of suffering, contains both 
reducible and irreducible elements: the non-physical and the physical, the expressible and 
the inexpressible elements. Although affliction is inseparable from suffering, it is 
different and something specific. I argued that Weil’s conception of affliction can be 
beset understood as a momentarily numinous experience of God’s absence or the absolute 
good.  Numinous experience, according to Otto, is a kind of experience which contains a 
quite specific moment and which remains ineffable. That is also why it cannot be 
explained and articulated. I have also tried to show that what shows itself to us in 
affliction can only be felt.  That is to say, Weil’s investigation of affliction concentrates 
on the feeling response to the absence or silence of God, the feeling which remains where 
the concept or language fails. Nonetheless, religious, ethical, and aesthetical expressions 
specifically, poetic and musical expressions, are suggested as a possibility of indirect 
expression for grasping what is inarticulate in affliction. In other words, the notion of the 
absolute good or God, which (and who) lies beyond the region of necessity and the 
boundaries of language, can only be commutated by means of indirect expressions.  
  Finally, Just as the primary point of Weil’s investigation of necessity is to disclose 
that which lies outside its range, the good or God, so too the primary point of her 
investigation of affliction, as Robert Chenavier has observed, is to show that affliction is 
more likely capable of ‘unveiling the back side of necessity’, the good, God, or the 
transcendental reality.  And that is why we have been insisting that affliction is the most 
illuminating key to understanding the authority that the absolute good, lying in the back 
93 
 
and dark side of necessity, can have over us—we are subject to a blind necessity or force 
and yet yearning for the good or justice.   
 
4.1 A Potential Concern 
In his “Introduction” to Weil’s Lectures on Philosophy, Peter Winch mentions that 
there is a difficulty in placing “her work firmly within any currently living tradition of 
thinking. [But Winch also reminds us that] (The disintegration of contemporary culture 
which is partly responsible for this was of course one of the great themes to which 
Simone Weil addressed herself)”.
425
  Thus, to place Weil’s position in a historical context, 
one, as mentioned earlier, needs to read Weil in a contra modern fashion, surely as a 
reinvigoration of Platonism, as well Christianity.  It should also be mentioned, as George 
Grant remarks, that Weil criticizes “the very root of intellectual modernity which after all 
came from the enlightenment which had made that intellectual tradition”:
426
 the utopian 
progressivity myth of enlightenment and Hegel and Marx. In a way, the most general 
characteristics of modern approaches can be described as historical paths to 
redemption.—even Weil has, to some extent, categorized Christianity as a historical 
approach, since, Weil states, it has also tried to discover “harmony in history”.427  That is 
why we argue that Weil’s place lies in her rejection of modern thought trying to seek 
finality in the future.  Should one not then call Weil: an anti-historical, or a non-
historical, or an essentialist?  
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Richard Rorty writes, “traditional philosophy [is] an attempt to escape from 
history—an attempt to find nonhistorical condition of any possible historical 
development”.
428
  Apparently, Weil’s approach is described as a nonhistorical or may be 
an anti-historical. To speak to this concern in a fairly profound way is not an essay task 
since in our contemporary intellectual culture, essentialism, anti-historicism, or non-
historicism, though they are ambiguous terms, are widely either misunderstood or 
rejected. This concern, as far as I am aware, has not been raised and discussed by Weilian 
scholars.  Therefore, this should be taken as a serious concern and needs to be carried out 
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perspective, the common message of [later] Wittgenstein… is a historical one”.  
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